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THE AMERICAN WAY—UNTIL MACHINE LEARNING
ALGORITHM BEATS THE LAW?
Dr. Asress Adimi Gikay *
Algorithmic consumer credit scoring has caused anxiety among scholars
and policy makers. After a significant legislative effort by the European Union, the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that has provisions tailored to
automated decision-making (ADM) was implemented. When the EU Commission
and the US Department of Commerce negotiated for US organizations to whom
data from EU data controller is transferred to comply with the key principles of EU
Data Protection Law under the EU-US Privacy Shield (PS) Framework, the
Department of Commerce refused to incorporate the GDPR principles governing
ADM in the PS Framework. The EU Commission accepted this refusal reasoning
that where US companies make automated decisions with respect to EU data
subjects, such as in consumer credit risk scoring, there are laws in the US that
protect the consumer from adverse decisions. This view contradicts
recommendations for implementing GDPR-Inspired law in the US to tackle the
challenges of automated consumer credit scoring.
This article argues that despite the differences in the approach to the
regulation of automated consumer credit scoring in the EU and the US, consumers
are similarly protected in both jurisdictions. Furthermore, US consumer credit
laws have the necessary flexibility to ensure that adverse automated decisions are
tackled effectively. This article, through analyzing statutes, cases, and empirical
evidence, demonstrates that the seemingly comprehensive legal rules governing
ADM in the GDPR do not make the EU consumers better off. In addition, the
challenges presented by the increasing sophistication of Artificial Intelligence (AI),
especially machine learning, place both the EU and the US legal regimes in a
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similar position as neither jurisdiction is equipped to respond to autonomous,
unpredictable, and unexplainable algorithms making decisions.
While the EU’s risk-based approach to AI regulation adopted by the Draft
AI Regulation which also contains provisions on regulatory sandboxing is a
significant improvement, it does not significantly change the rules regarding
algorithmic consumer credit scoring. Nevertheless, this is the approach that
regulation should primarily adopt for the future.
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1. INTRODUCTION
THE CONTEXT
Any financial institution that engages in the business of lending money in
the European Union (EU) or the United States (US) has the right and obligation to
ensure a thorough assessment of the borrower’s capacity to repay the loan. In the
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, attributed in part to the subprime
mortgage crisis, 1 the responsibility to assess consumer borrowers’ ability to repay
has been more standardized and strengthened in both jurisdictions. 2 In modern
credit risk assessment processes, the likelihood of the borrower defaulting is
evaluated through a statistical method using the consumer’s credit data and is
reduced to a specific number—the credit score. 3 Over the years, creditworthiness
assessment has evolved from interview-based assessment and decisions made by
loan officers, 4 to automated decision-making with minimal human intervention.
These decisions are based on data collected from the consumer, but also much more
unlikely sources such as social networks. 5 These automated decisions in financial
services have attracted the attention of scholars, regulators, and consumer advocacy
groups who are often concerned that by using algorithms and big data, financial
institutions may circumvent legal regimes that protect consumers and other
vulnerable groups. This is due to the financial institution’s use of predictive analysis

IMAD A. MOSSA, GOOD REGULATION, BAD REGULATION THE ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION102 (2015); see generally Steven Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the
Subprime Financial Crisis, 60S. C. L. REV. 549-571 (2009).
2
In the EU, one of the important pieces of legislations that emerged after the 2008 financial crisis
is Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on
Credit Agreements for Consumers Relating to Residential Immovable Property and Amending
Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, 2014 O.J. (L 60) 3
[hereinafter “Consumer Mortgage Directive”]. In the US, The Dodd Frank Act introduced the
Ability-to- Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule — Regulation Z, effective 1/10/2014. The Dodd
Frank Act introduced the Ability-to- Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule — Regulation Z,
effective 1/10/2014. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued a final rule to
implement this regulation that provides eight criteria to determine the consumer’s ability to pay
on a mortgage. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2013).
3
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, What is a credit
score, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-credit- score-en315/ (last updated June 8, 2017).
4
Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.KENT L. REV.3, 11-12 (2018).
5
Nate Cullerton, Behavioral Credit Scoring, 110 GEO L. J. 808, 815 (2013); see also Yanhao Wei
et al., Credit Scoring with Social Network Data, 35 MARKETING SCI. 234-258 (2015).
1
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that may bypass decision-making which is based on the objective assessment of the
individual consumer’s circumstances. 6
In the EU, the most significant legal instrument governing automated consumer
credit scoring is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 7 which contains
a few provisions tailored to Automated Decision Making (ADM). 8 The GDPR has
triggered a great deal of change in how businesses manage personal data not only
for entities established in the EU but also non-EU entities with a business link to
the EU. 9 While it is yet to be proven whether the GDPR provisions on ADM
achieve their intended objective of protecting the consumer from potentially
arbitrary and opaque algorithmic decisions, it has been touted as a model for the
regulation of not only data privacy in general but also automated consumer credit
scoring in the US. 10
In 2016, the EU Commission and the US Department of Commerce
implemented the EU-US Privacy Shield (PS) Framework, under which US-based
organizations to whom EU-based data controllers transfer data self-certify 11 to
comply with the key principles of the GDPR. 12 The final document of the EU-US
PS Framework excluded the principles of GDPR on ADM. 13
In the US, the most significant federal statutes pertinent to ADM are the Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999, commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-

See Giovanni Comandè, Regulating Algorithms Regulation? First Ethico-Legal Principles,
Problems and Opportunities of Algorithms, in 32 STUDIES IN BIG DATA 169, 174 (Tania
Cerquitelli, Daniel Quercia& Frank Pasquale eds., 2017); see also Matthew Adam Bruckner,
supra note 4, at 26.
7
Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive, Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119)
[hereinafter “GDPR”].
8
See id. at recital 71; arts. 2, 14, 20, 21, 22.
9
Cedric Ryngaert & Mistale Taylor, The GDPR as Global Data Protection, 114 AJIL
UNBOUND 5, 9 (2020).
For extra-territorial application of the GDPR, see GDPR, art. 3.
10
Vlad E. Hertza, Fighting Unfair Classifications in Credit Reporting: Should the United States
Adopt GDPR-Inspired Rights in Regulating Consumer Credit, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1707,
1712 (2018).
11
Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207).
12
The EU-US Privacy Shield decision was adopted on 12 July 2016 and the Privacy Shield
framework became operational on 1 August 2016. EU-US data transfers, EUR.
COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-dataprotection/eu-us-data-transfers_en (last visited March 13, 2012).
13
See infra section 4.3.2(B)(i).
6
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Bliley Act (GLBA), 14 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA). 15 Despite the existence of these sector specific
legislation the EU Commission found to be satisfactory, studies claim that
automated credit scoring is inadequately regulated in the US. 16 This aligns with the
overwhelming sentiment that the US is lagging behind in terms of protecting
consumer privacy. 17 In fact, in a New York University Law Review article, Hertza
called for GDPR- inspired reform of the legal regimes governing ADM in consumer
credit reporting in the US. 18
The enactment of the first comprehensive privacy law in California in
2018—the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 19 – also seems to be
suggestive of the pressure being felt by lawmakers in addressing privacy concerns
in the US. This article argues that while US privacy law in general may require
reform, the US does not need specific rules for automated consumer credit scoring.
The existing literature calling for reform in the US is based on flawed premises that
(a) the US legal rules governing consumer credit are incapable of addressing
technology-driven legal challenges, and (b) the GDPR provisions on ADM
effectively protect the consumer. Neither assumption has been closely examined or
validated based on empirical evidence and the actual enforcement cases.
THE KEY CLAIM
This article argues that despite the differences in the approach to regulation
of ADM in consumer loan underwriting in the EU and the US, the two legal
jurisdictions respond to the phenomenon in a fairly similar manner. This article

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691(f).
16
Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era
of Big Data, 18 YALE J. L.& TECH. 148 (2016);
see also Hertza, supra note 10.
17
See Kelsy Wroten, Why is America So Far Behind Europe
on Digital Privacy, N. Y. TIMES (June 8,
2019), https://www nytimes.com/2019/06/08/opinion/sunday/privacy-congress-facebookgoogle.html; see also Thomas Holt, Data Privacy Rules in the EU May Leave the US Behind,
THE CONVERSATION(Jan. 23, 2019),https://theconversation.com/data-privacy-rules-in-the-eumay-leave-the-us-behind-110330.
18
Hertza, supra note 10 (arguing for a General Data Protection Regulation-inspired law for
consumer credit scoring in the US and claiming that the US Fair Credit Reporting Act and the
Equal Credit Opportunities Act are not sufficient to address the challenges of alternative credit
scoring. Although Hertza focuses on algorithmic credit scoring, he calls for an overarching reform
of US data protection law).
19
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2020).
14
15
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examines statutory and relevant enforcement cases including judicial decisions in
both jurisdictions.
First, the article aims to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of
the two legal regimes with respect to automated consumer credit scoring. Second,
it shows that contrary to the prevailing view, the lack of recently implemented legal
regime governing ADM in the US does not mean that US consumers are worse off
when compared to their EU counterparts. Third, the challenge presented by the
increasing sophistication of Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially machine
learning, puts both the EU and the US in the same regulatory and legal quandary as
neither jurisdiction is equipped to respond to autonomous, unpredictable, and
unexplainable algorithms making critical decisions. 20
RAISON D’ÊTRE
There are three main reasons behind writing this article. First, there are
theories for reform in the US inspired by the GDPR for the regulation of ADM in
the consumer credit industry, 21 whose validity requires scrutiny. Existing literature
portrays the GDPR as a good model for reform—a view that this articles questions.
The theory is tested by analyzing the legal regimes in the two jurisdictions as well
as enforcement cases (including judicial decisions) and empirical evidence on
consumer behavior. In the two years since the GDPR has been implemented, no
such work has been undertaken, despite academics not being shy about alluding to
the superiority of the GDPR in regulating ADM.

Maja Brkan & Grégory Bonnet, Legal and Technical Feasibility of the GDPR’s Quest for
Explanation of Algorithmic Decisions: of Black Boxes, White Boxes and Fata Morgana, 11 EUR. J.
RISK REGULATION 19, 49 (2020).
21
Pasquale argues: “Data protection rules like the GDPR effectively raise the cost of surveillance
and algorithmic processing of people. They help re-channel technologies of algorithmic
governance toward managing the natural world, rather than managing people.” Frank
Pasquale, Data Nationalization in the Shadow of
Social Credit Systems, L. POL ECON. PROJECT (June 18, 2018),
https://lpeblog.org/2018/06/18/data-nationalization-in-the- shadow-of-social-credit-systems/. In
his testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs he asserted that policymakers “…should look to Europe’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which provides several standards
for algorithmic accountability.” Frank Pasquale, Exploring the Fintech Landscape, Written
Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs (Sept. 12, 2017),https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pasquale%20Testimony
%209-12-17.pdf; see also Hertza, supra note 10(arguing why the US should adopt GDPR-Inspired
legal regime specifically for ADM in consumer credit risk assessment).
20
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Second, current legal developments could potentially depict US data
privacy law as completely inapt to cope with technological challenges. On July 16,
2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) struck down the EU
Commission’s decision which held that the US has a privacy legal regime that
provides adequate protection to EU consumers — ‘the Adequacy Decision’ 22—that
has been valid since 2016. 23 Under this judgment, Facebook Ireland and, as a
consequence of the judgment, other EU data controllers were prohibited from
transferring data to the US under the Adequacy Decision. 24 This judgment is likely
to amplify the sentiment that US data privacy law in general is weak. The court
found the Adequacy Decision invalid only because data subjects whose data are
transferred from the EU do not have the same level of protection due to lack of
protective safeguard for consumer rights vis-à-vis public authorities. 25 These rights
include access and enforceable rights, as well as channels for an effective remedy
in the context of data processing by public authorities in pursuit of national security
interest and law enforcement. 26 In other words, the prevalence of state surveillance
under various legislations, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) 27 and Executive Order 12333, 28 enables public authorities to access data
from private actors without sufficient safeguards indicating that the US does not
provide adequate data protection to EU consumers. 29 In the aftermath of the ECJ
judgment, confusions about how good a model the GDPR is for reforming data
privacy law pertaining to ADM are likely to reign, whilst the specific reasoning of
the court is likely to be neglected.
Third, the general contentment with the provisions of GDPR governing
ADM has the effect of deterring further necessary works that must be done to revise
the rules. This article cautions about the false sense of security that seems to be
prevailing regarding the level of consumer protection which the GDPR can provide.

Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems, Case C-311/18, 2020
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶198 (July 16, 2020).
23
Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250.
24
Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. And Maximillian Schrems, Case C-311/18, at ¶¶197201.
25
Id. ¶¶165-168.
26
Id. ¶¶115-140, 203.
27
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c).
28
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
29
Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. And Maximillian Schrems, Case C-311/18, at ¶192.
22
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It is not within the purview of this article to show the extent and manner in
which US data privacy law should be reformed. 30 But, it argues that the rules
governing ADM in the consumer credit industry available under the GDPR should
not cloud the judgment of policy makers regarding the GDPR’s actual
efficacy/inefficacy with respect to ADM.
STRUCTURE
The article is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
ADM in consumer credit risk assessment. In this section, a succinct differentiation
is made between various related and fundamental concepts namely, Algorithm,
ADM, AI, and machine learning. While this section shortly addresses divergent
theories about the definition of AI, it does not take a position on what an AI is
because settling the definitional controversy around AI requires a separate work.
For this reason, the article prefers the term ADM that encompasses all algorithmic
decisions that remove human intervention significantly from the process. Section 3
analyzes the opportunities and risks in automated consumer credit scoring. This
section examines efficiency, impartiality, and financial inclusion as benefits of
automated consumer credit scoring, and inaccuracy and bias/discrimination as the
concomitant risks. Section 4 investigates effective consumer protection in the EU
and the US, by examining privacy consent and transparency in automated consumer
credit scoring. It will be demonstrated that the legal rules and recent enforcement
in the US show that a tailor-made legal regime is not required to address consumer
vulnerability. Section 5 addresses the unique challenges of machine learning that
limit the effectiveness of legal rules and suggests a holistic approach to tackling the
challenge that both jurisdictions should adopt moving forward. It examines riskbased approaches to the regulation with respect to machine learning credit scoring
and regulatory sandboxing as potential solutions to be adopted. The article argues
while these solutions are adopted by the EU’ Draft AI Regulation (hereinafter

For insights into reforming US Privacy law, see Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118
YALE L. J. 902 (2009) (arguing that it would be a mistake for the United States to enact
a comprehensive or omnibus federal privacy law for the
private sector that preempts sectoral privacy law); Alan Charles Raul, et al.,
, United States, in THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY L. REV., 3
99-421 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 2019) (tracking the shift in US privacy regulation); Lindsey
Barret, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law,
the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 49 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. (2019) (comparing and
contrasting the US and European models of privacy regulation).
30
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“DAIR”), 31 the proposed regulation does not satisfactorily implement the notion of
risk-based approach. Section 6 will provide concluding remarks.
2. AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING
2.1.

CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING

Consumer credit scoring is a method of quantifying the credit risk posed by
a borrower using a statistical method to determine the effect of various credit data
associated with the loan applicant on the applicant’s probability of default. 32 Credit
scoring has been through several stages of evolution. There was a time when a
person’s standing in the community sufficed to strike a loan deal with a bank. 33
Historically, credit reporting agencies used to conduct consumer credit risk
assessment through information collated by hired professional reporters who
profiled potential customers. 34 The more modern and standardized procedure
involved assessing creditworthiness based on information supplied by the
customer, obtained from other conventional sources and face-to-face interview
where loan officers exercised a discretion in their final decision. 35 Today, credit
scoring has changed significantly with the technological advancement.
2.2.

AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING—THE RISE OF ALGORITHMS

Already in the 1940s, the credit scoring system started to introduce semiautomation that relied largely on manual implementation of the scoring system. 36
31

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down
Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain
Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final, (21 April 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2021/EN/COM-2021-206-F1-EN-MAIN-PART1.PDF
32
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its
Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit at S-1 (August 2007),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf; Loretta J.
Mester, What is the Point of Credit Scoring, BUS. REV. (1997), https://www.philadelphiafed.org//media/frbp/assets/economy/articles/business-review/1997/september-october/brso97lm.pdf.
33
Cullerton, supra note 5, at 880.
34
Rachel O’Dwyer, Algorithms are making the same mistakes assessing credit scores that humans
did a century ago, QUARTZ (May 14, 2018), https://qz.com/1276781/algorithms-are-making-thesame-mistakes-assessing-credit-scores-that-humans-did-a-century-ago/.
35
Kenneth G. Gunter, Computerized Credit Scoring's Effect on the Lending Industry, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 443, 443 (2000).
36
Peter L. McCorkell, The Impact of Credit Scoring and Automated Underwriting on Credit
Availability in the IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 209, 209-10 (Thomas A.
Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002).
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A more advanced automated credit scoring was introduced in the 1950s by Fair and
Isaac who believed that algorithmic decisions would be better than decisions based
on human judgment. 37 The FICO score which is widely used by financial
institutions today (about 90 % of top lenders in the US), 38 have various ranges for
different financial products with 300-850 (for mortgage) —a higher score
representing less risk. 39
When a financial institution conducts FICO score for a loan applicant, the
computer algorithm analyzes the applicant’s credit risk based on his/her credit
history(history of borrowing and repayment including default) held at the top three
credit bureaus—Experian, Equifax and TransUnion. 40 The FICO scoring
proprietary algorithm looks for patterns in the credit report data “that historically
have been associated with payment defaults among consumers” on the basis of
which it assigns the credit score. 41 Thus, the algorithm collects collates, classifies,
and analyses thousands of data points to make a predictive decision. The criteria
for FICO scoring are by far generally comprehensible, if not fully explainable—
payment history (35%), credit utilization ratio (30%) length of credit history (15%),
credit mix (10%), and credit inquiries (10%). 42 While the legitimacy of these
criteria could be questioned on its own, FICO scores could also be wrong if the
credit information received from the credit bureaus is inaccurate. 43
In the realm of automated consumer credit scoring, FICO scoring
algorithms could be regarded as the tip of the iceberg. In the FinTech sector, there
are several online credit facilities where a decision on the consumer’s application
is processed instantly using machine learning algorithms without the involvement

37

Id.
What is a Credit Score?,MYFICO,https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/creditscores#:~:text=A%20credit%20score%20tells%20lenders,by%2090%25%20of%20top%20lenders
.
39
Constance Brinkley-Badgett, What Does FICO Stand For? What is a FICO Score?,CREDIT.COM
(Apr. 11, 2018),https://www.credit.com/credit-scores/what-does-fico-stand-for-and-what-is-a-ficocredit-score/.
40
Jim Akin, What are the Different Credit Scoring Ranges?, EXPERIAN(June 23, 2020),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/infographic-what-are-the-different-scoringranges/#s4.
41
Id.
42
Jeanine Skowronski, What Is a FICO Credit Report or FICO Score?, CREDIT.COM (Apr. 15,
2019),https://www.credit.com/credit-reports/credit-bureau/fico-credit-report/.
43
How do I correct errors on my credit reports?, MYFICO, https://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/faq/credit-reports/correcting-credit-reporterrors#:~:text=To%20correct%20errors%20on%20your,report%20can%20hurt%20your%20score.
38
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of a human decision maker. 44 Online lenders may use an algorithm and thousands
of pieces of information about its customers to make a decision on short term loans
in seconds. 45 Once the consumer submits an application, the algorithm collects data
about the consumer supplied by the consumer and mined from different online
platforms 46 and scores the applicant and decides either to grant or deny the loan or
classify which type of loan the applicant is qualified for. There are several
companies that provide machine learning software for credit risk assessment
including Zestfinance, Kreditech and SAS. 47 All of these automated credit scoring
systems have algorithms in common.
2.2.1. FROM ALGORITHMS TO MACHINE LEARNING
The underlying tool of any automated consumer credit scoring is an
algorithm. According to Coormen, a computer algorithm is “a set of steps to
accomplish a task that is described precisely enough that a computer can run it.” 48
While some algorithms perform relatively simpler tasks such as computing a simple
mathematical equation, others that are referred to as AI engage in complex
decision-making process that involve mimicking human intelligence (“certain
operations of human brain”). 49 Thus, automated consumer credit scoring could be
conducted by machine learning—a sub-field of AI 50 that uses computers to learn
patterns and rules from data and experience. 51
But, there is no agreement as to when an algorithm becomes AI rather than
a tool that fails to meet the threshold of intelligence, leading to a significant
Anna Oleksyuk, 5 Uses of Machine Learning in Finance and FinTech, MEDIUM (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://medium.com/@annoleksyuk/5-uses-of-machine-learning-in-finance-and-fintech9cf4a7530695.
45
Parmy Olson, The Algorithm That Beats Your Bank Manager, FORBES (Mar. 15,
2015),https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/03/15/the-algorithm-that-beats-your-bankmanager/#2cf600d81ae9.
46
Cullerton supra note 5, at 809.
47
Niccolo Mejia, AI for Credit Scoring – An Overview of Startups and Innovation, EMERJ (Jan. 18,
2019), https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/ai-for-credit-scoring-an-overview-of-startups-andinnovation/.
48
THOMAS H. COORMEN, ALGORITHMS UNLOCKED 1(2013).
49
Lauri Donahue, Comment, A Primer on Using Artificial Intelligence in the Legal Profession,
HARV. J. OF L. TECH. (January 3, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-primer-on-usingartificial-intelligence-in-the-legal-profession.
50
PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING
MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 8(2015).
51
YADONG CUI, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION 120 (2020) (“It can be
said that machine learning is the study of ‘learning algorithms,’ which are essentially advanced
versions of ordinary algorithms that make computer programs smarter by automatically
discovering and learning data rules.”).
44
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difference of opinion regarding the definition of AI. 52 Since many of the FinTech
companies employ machine learning algorithms and possibly deep learning
techniques, 53 and the legal challenges posed by machines learning are peculiar, the
distinction between algorithms and AI is useful to bear in mind.
Kaplan argues that it is difficult to answer the question “what is artificial
intelligence” because (a) of the lack of commonly agreed upon definition of
intelligence, and (b) so far, machine intelligence and human intelligence bear no
resemblance, 54 the latter making it questionable to define AI with human
intelligence as a point of reference. In Turner’s words, “[d]efining AI can resemble
chasing the horizon: as soon as you get to where it was, it has moved somewhere
into the distance.” 55 Despite the tricky nature of AI, Turner argues that defining it
is required because it is crucial to have a “specific and workable definition when
describing conducts and phenomena which are subject to regulation.” 56
Turner takes a functional approach to AI by describing it as “the ability of
a non-natural entity to make choices by an evaluative process.” 57 According to him,
AI should possess the ability to make choice autonomously and to weigh various
principles in making a decision. 58 Turner’s definition takes a narrow approach to
AI. Surden distinguishes between machine learning and knowledge representation
and reasoning (KR), 59 as branches of AI. While machine learning AI has “[t]he
ability to automatically learn and improve from experience without being explicitly
programmed,” 60 KR (Rule Based AI) operates based on pre-determined set of
parameters. 61 Rule-Based AI may also be referred to as deterministic algorithm

Automating Society: Taking Stock of Automated Decision-Making in the EU, ALGORITHM
WATCH (2019), https://algorithmwatch.org/en/automating-society-2019/ (“Artificial Intelligence is
a fuzzily defined term that encompasses a wide range of controversial ideas and therefore is not
very useful to address the issues at hand.”).
53
Deep learning is an advanced form of machine learning. See Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic
Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1395 (2019). Although deep
learning is considered to present even a heightened legal challenge, this article does not make a
distinction between deep learning and machine learning as making such distinction is not required
for the narrative of the article.
54
JERRY KAPLAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1 (2016).
55
JACOB TURNER, ROBOT RULES: REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 8 (2019).
56
Id. at 8-9.
57
Id. at 16.
58
Id. at 16-17.
59
Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305, 1337
(2019).
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Id. at 1311, 1315; see also Cofone, supra note 53, at 1394.
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Surden, supra note 59, at 1316.
52

10

The American Way—Until Machine Learning Algorithm Beats the Law?
because this type of AI “produces on a given input the same results following the
same computation steps.” 62
Turner argues that the Rule-Based AI, which he identifies as Symbolic
Program (or Good Old AI or Classical AI) does not qualify as AI. 63 He believes
that any intelligence reflected in this type of program which functions with decision
tree (if X, then Y), is of the programmer and not of itself. 64 The rationale behind
this approach is that no matter how well the algorithm performs a computation,
because the program follows the same rule written by the software programmer, it
does not possess intelligence different from what the designer has embodied in it.65
If Turner’s approach is followed, a human being that otherwise is
considered intelligent would fail to be treated as an intelligent being. First, a human
being for the most part learns from its surrounding environment 66 and is to a certain
degree programmed to reproduce certain outcomes. This fact by itself does not
make a human being a non-intelligent entity. A fully grown adult that for some
reason is unable to improve its emotional intelligence 67 but computes the most
complex mathematical problems with exceptional speed does not cease to be an
intelligent being because mathematics is learned from someone and there is no
improvement in any other aspect of its intelligence.
To be fair, it is possible to provide equally convincing reasons in support of
Turner’s narrow approached to defining AI. Unsurprisingly, any given definition
of AI is amenable to criticism from various angles which makes attempt to provide
a universal definition futile. While intuitively, this is concerning from the
perspective of framing legal policies and rules, some argue that the lack of universal
definition has helped grow the field and allowed researchers, practitioners, and
developers to be guided by a rough sense of direction. 68 In the same vein, this article
A. Bockmayr and K. Reinert, Concepts: Types of Algorithm, DISCRETE MATH FOR
BIOINFORMATICS WS 10/11(Oct. 18, 2010), http://www mi fuberlin.de/wiki/pub/ABI/DiscretMathWS10/runtime.pdf.
63
Turner, supra note 55, at 18.
64
Id. at 19.
65
See id. at 18.
66
Elsbeth Stern, Individual differences in the learning potential of human beings, NPJ SCI. OF
LEARNING, Jan. 12, 2017, at 1.
67
“[A]n emotional, intelligence competency is an ability to recognize, understand, and use
emotional information about oneself that leads to or causes effective or superior performance.”
Richard E. Boyatzis, A behavioral approach to emotional Intelligence, 28 J. OF MGMT DEV. 749,
757 (2009).
68
Peter Stone et al., Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030, ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: REPORT OF THE 2015 STUDY PANEL, 1, 12 (Sept. 2016),
http://ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report.
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does not intend to settle the definitional controversy in AI. It rather takes a broader
approach by employing a generic term automated consumer credit scoring (or
ADM) that encompasses both symbolic programs and machine learning. The
cursory review of the controversy surrounding the definition of AI is necessary only
to highlight on the fact that machine learning being a branch of AI presents an
unprecedented legal challenge.
Machine learning scoring could effortlessly combine and analyze data
collected from the consumer, third parties (like data brokers), public platforms (like
social networking sites), and financial institutions related to the scoring service
providers (or the financial institution) through complex contractual relationships.69
This gives the entity conducting the credit risk assessment a wide range of data
points. 70 Second, with algorithms, the data collection and analysis could be
conducted in a fraction of second. 71 Third, there could be higher propensity for
inaccurate data to go undetected and the consequences of the inaccuracies would
go unmitigated. 72 Finally, automated scoring could mask discriminatory practices
that allow financial institutions to remove factors that are defined as illegal from
their scoring criteria by using proxies such as zip codes. 73 Ultimately, while the
algorithm removes human oversight and potentially distances humans from liability
for decisions, it could foster decisions that may not accurately reflect the
consumer’s personal circumstance based on co-relations rather than causation. 74
While determinist algorithmic scoring raises many concerns, machine
learning presents heightened regulatory challenges. 75 The ability of the machine to
learn from its experience and to update its decision independently of human

McCorkell, supra note 36, at 812.
Daniel Faggella, Machine Learning for Underwriting and Credit Scoring - Current Possibilities,
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Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation,
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516 (2018).
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oversight causes a great concern for scholars, consumers and policy makers. 76 The
dynamic interaction of algorithm with big data 77 and its ability to make biased and
discriminatory decisions without the corresponding duty of explanation represents
a new chapter in the algorithmic regulatory challenge. 78 No legal regime today,
including the GDPR, is equipped to deal with complex machine learning decision
systems.
3. THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT
SCORING
3.1.

THE ADVANTAGES OF AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING

Despite the growing concern about algorithmic decisions, algorithms are
becoming an integral part of financial services today. Automated consumer credit
scoring could provide three major benefits—efficiency, impartiality, and financial
inclusion.
3.1.1. EFFICIENCY
Automated consumer credit scoring is deemed to be efficient as it increases
the ease of using multiple data points with low transaction cost and enhances
potentially more accurate decisions by increasing the amount of data point used to
assess the consumer’s credit risk. 79 In addition to utilizing the so-called traditional
credit data, such as “loan or credit limit information, debt repayment history,
account status, “credit inquiries,” and “public records relating to bankruptcies,” 80
automated (alternative credit scoring) exploits non-traditional credit data, including
“[r]ental payments, [m]obile phone payments, [c]able TV payments, [b]ank
account information, such as deposits, withdrawals or transfers, [and][s]mall dollar

Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithm, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 660(2017).
JAMES R. KALYVAS & MICHAEL R. OVERLY, BIG DATA: A BUSINESS AND LEGAL GUIDE 1
(2015).
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See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L.
REV. 671 (2017).
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Regulation of Consumer Credit Markets, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Nov. 1, 2018),
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https://www.experian.com/assets/consumer-information/white-papers/alternative-credit-datapaper.pdf.
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loans.” 81 It may even use insights from social media 82 and other digital footprints.83
Consequently, automated consumer credit scoring is efficient on two fronts.
Automated consumer credit scoring eases and reduces the cost of processing
alternative data including “social media footprints, psychometrics, online behavior
data, and telecommunications data, including top-up patterns (for prepaid
customers), mobile money use, and even calling patterns and contacts.” 84 From the
lender’s point of view, algorithms can reduce the cost of acquiring and processing
information using human labor and the potential loss from granting a loan to a
credit-unworthy consumer. 85
By increasing the data point that can be used for scoring, automated scoring
could increase accuracy and reduce the incidence of refusing loan to a creditworthy
consumer. 86 It could in turn ensure that credit is distributed efficiently. 87 Although
there is no conclusive evidence that consumers ultimately gain from the efficiency
stemming from accurate automated consumer credit scoring, 88 what is indisputable
is that automated consumer credit scoring gives lenders a speed advantage in loan
processing and thus in the short-run reduces transaction cost.
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3.1.2. IMPARTIALITY—FROM ALGORITHMIC SCORE TO AN IMPARTIAL
LOAN OFFICER
One of the potential advantages of algorithmic decisions is objectivity and
neutrality. In theory algorithms should remove human bias from the decisionmaking both by using neutral data points and by ensuring that the decision based
on such data points is not manipulated to advance or perpetuate human bias.
Nevertheless, the existing literature show a great skepticism toward algorithmic
neutrality arguing that facially neutral factors may be used as proxy for prohibited
characteristics, 89 while human biases could be replicated or even amplified by
seemingly neutral algorithms. 90 As a matter of principle, automated consumer
credit scoring ensures that loan officers do not insert their biases or malice in the
decision-making process.
On many occasions, automated consumer credit scores have proven to be
an incontrovertible and impartial evidence in claims of discrimination against banks
in the US. The large body of literature in this field, zealously wanting to ring an
alarm bell about algorithmic bias and unfairness, ignore some of the instances in
which consumers have used their algorithmic scores to prove discrimination by
human loan officers.
In United States vs Deposit Guaranty National Bank, the defendant bank
engaged in discriminatory lending practice where “loan officers had broad
discretion to make override decisions, known as judgmental overrides, for creditscored loan applications—that is, decisions to deny credit to applicants who scored
at or above the stated cutoff score for loan approval (high side overrides) and to
grant credit to applicants who scored below that cutoff score (low side
overrides).” 91 According to the claim, African American loan applicants were three
times more likely to be rejected compared to white applicants. 92 The court entered
a settlement order which, among others requirements, required the defendant to
Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1267 (2020).
90
See Philip Hacker, Teaching Fairness Artificial Intelligence: Existing and Novel Strategies
against Algorithmic Discrimination under EU Law, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1143, 1146
(2020); Johnson et al., supra note 72, at 506; Nicol Turner Lee et al, Algorithmic bias detection
and mitigation: Best practices and policies to reduce consumer harms, BROOKINGS (May 22,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-bestpractices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/.
91
United States v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank, No. 3:99CV670, Settlement at 2, (S.D. Miss.
1999), https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcement-cases-documents-119 (internal
quotations omitted).
92
Id.
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establish $3 million compensation trust fund for the victims of its discriminatory
lending practices. 93
Wells Fargo Bank similarly engaged in a discriminatory lending practice in
mortgage loan underwriting by placing African American and Hispanic American
borrowers into subprime loans, “with adverse terms and conditions such as high
interest rates, excessive fees, pre-payment penalties, and unavoidable future
payment hikes, when similarly qualified Non-Hispanic white . . . borrowers
received prime loans.” 94 The African American and Hispanic American plaintiffs
in the dispute had, in some cases, higher credit score than White applicants. 95 Wells
Fargo settled the case for $175 million.96
In 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) secured a settlement of $10.6 million for
discriminatory lending through redlining from BancorpSouth. 97 The story is the
same—BancorpSouth engaged in discriminatory mortgage loan practice by
providing loans to Caucasian Americans with about a 622 credit score while
denying to African-Americans with credit score of 625, and according to the
allegation with higher income and better credit history. 98 To the author’s best
knowledge, there are no similar cases reported in the EU.
The list of cases in which algorithmic credit scores were used to assert
claims of discrimination could be long. 99 The obvious implication of these cases is
that automated credit scoring may indeed compel financial institutions to uphold
impartial decision making in loan underwriting. Although things are more complex
when machine learning techniques come into the picture, the evidence does show
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that consumers are not always the losers when an impartial and untampered
algorithm speaks.
3.1.3. FINANCIAL INCLUSION
The third potential advantage of automated consumer credit scoring is
financial inclusion. Limited amount of research shows that alternative credit
scoring is financially inclusive, i.e., provides access to financial services to those
that are considered unscorable, invisible or credit unworthy. 100
The traditional credit scoring system, due to the limited amount of data
points it utilizes, is considered exclusionary, which could lead to lack of access to
financial services to millions of citizens. 101 The US CFPB estimated in 2015 that
11% of American consumers to be credit invisible. 102 According to a survey
conducted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 2017, about 8.4
million households representing roughly 20 million citizens (6 percent of the
households) were unbanked. 103 Although the overall figure in the EU in 2017 is
relatively lower at 3.6%, there is a non-negligible percentage of consumers with no
access to financial services in different Member States. 104
With a continuous change in demographics created by migration, the
difference in income, and opportunity in access to financial services, the issue of
credit scoring and financial inclusion is likely to become more pertinent. A study
in access to financial services shows alarming level of discrimination based on
ethnic origin in the financial industry in the EU Member States. 105 A group of
researchers sent banking related inquires to 1,281 banks in seven EU Member states
using emails with “domestic names” and “Arabic Names.” 106 Their finding showed
a lower response rate in investment and loan related inquires coming from
NICK HENRY & JOHN MORRIS, SCALING UP AFFORDABLE LENDING: INCLUSIVE CREDIT
SCORING 10-12 (2018).
101
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102
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103
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104
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(Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1990, 2017),
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‘immigrants’ was a result of discrimination. 107 In a similar study conducted in
Sweden that was published in 2016, focused on self-employed immigrants,
established that self-employed European immigrants and non-European
immigrants are more likely to be denied loans or be charged higher interest rates
compared to native applicants, with the situation being worse for non-European
immigrants. 108 Controlling for different variables that could justify differential
treatment, the researchers concluded that the difference in terms of accessing loan
could only be explained by discrimination. 109 In Spain, local banks have
discriminated against vulnerable categories of consumers (mainly those with lower
income, technological skills, or financial literacy). 110 Clearly, although not EU
wide, these evidences shed a light on discrimination based on social or ethnic
background in financial services in EU Member States.
Although tackling discrimination is one aspect of fostering it, financial
inclusion requires financial institutions to actively and responsibly provide
financial services that are appropriate to the needs of different consumers including
the vulnerable ones. 111 How does automated consumer credit scoring play a part in
this? Advocates argue that by increasing the type of data that is used to assess the
consumer’s creditworthiness, automated credit scoring allows financial institutions
to embrace consumers that are otherwise ignored by financial institutions that use
traditional (legacy) credit scoring. 112 In this regard, empirical evidence shows a
mixed result. Lemieux and Jagtian, based on empirical studies, found that Fintech
companies using alternative data provide consumer mortgage to underserved
communities better than traditional banks. 113 By investigating practices of two
peer-to-peer lending platforms using algorithms for credit risk assessment in the
Netherlands, Buit concludes that FinTech lenders extend credit to borrowers who
generally qualify for loan from conventional lenders. 114
107
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3.1.4. AN OPEN QUESTION?
The three arguments presented in support of automated consumer credit
scoring are efficiency, impartiality, and financial inclusion. Automated consumer
credit scoring is recognized to enhance efficiency through speedy loan processing,
reduced labor costs, and arguably accurate classification, and prediction. 115
Illustrating impartiality, several cases involving racial discrimination in the US also
proved how algorithmic credit scores can be used to safeguard against
discriminatory loan underwriting. So far, it is not clear whether automated credit
scoring enhances financial inclusion as more empirical research is needed to
validate the theory. Nonetheless, automated consumer credit scoring does not need
to prove itself beneficial on all fronts. Algorithms replace a system where skilled
operators manually compute credit scores by using various sets of data, which is
considered cumbersome and costly. 116 At the very least, this efficiency benefit of
automated consumer credit scoring should be assessed against the potential risks.
3.2.

THE RISK OF AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING

This section provides an in-depth analysis of the risk of automated
consumer credit scoring. It focuses on two dominant risks (a) inaccuracy, and (b)
bias and discrimination.
3.2.1. INACCURACY
A decision to grant or deny credit is critical both for the lender and the
consumer. The lender has a legitimate interest in vetting the applicants to grant loan
only to those who are creditworthy. The consumer’s life may hinge on being
granted credit. Financing education, a home, motor vehicle, and many other
important aspects of the consumer’s life in the modern world depend in many cases
on accessing credit. 117 Those who are able to obtain credit have better chance of
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND VULNERABLE CONSUMERS (Cătălin Gabriel Stanescu
& Asress Adimi Gikay, eds., Routledge, 2020) 188.
115
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improving their personal lives whereas those who fail to meet the scoring criteria
may end up going downhill, because one bad score may lead to a series of events
that may further deteriorate the consumer’s creditworthiness. 118 Hence, it is
important that decisions are made with the utmost care and accurately reflect the
circumstance of the consumer.
Inaccuracy is a great concern in credit scoring, not only for alternative credit
scoring but also for traditional scoring system. 119 A 2013 FTC report revealed that
20% of consumers had at least one error on one of their three major credit reports,
out of which 5% had an implication on their credit opportunity. 120 An investigative
report in the UK consumer credit market published in 2014 showed that 38% of
consumers who checked their credit report in the last two years had uncovered
consequential errors in their credit report. 121 While it is alarming enough that errors
in credit report are prevalent, it is even more concerning that correcting errors upon
the consumer’s request is difficult. Even if the consumer manages to do so, it
happens only after the consumer has suffered a detriment. Sometimes, correcting
an error in the consumer’s data inserted and held by a credit bureau might take years
and could lead to court litigation. 122
Although big data-driven scoring is able to use an aggregate of different
data, the data or the inference made based on it may be inaccurate because the data
itself is obsolete or out of context. 123 The fact that the consumer has gone through
personal insolvency a decade ago may be correct data, but it certainly is likely to
be considered outdated and irrelevant to the current credit risk of the consumer at
the time of application. If the consumer has gone through financial literacy
programs and was able to meet his/her financial obligations successfully after the
insolvency, an adverse decision based on the consumer’s history of insolvency is
118
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likely to be inaccurate inference. For an algorithm, a history of bankruptcy perfectly
indicates that the consumer is risky whereas a more nuanced approach with a touch
of human judgment could lead to a different conclusion. Thus, accuracy, apart from
incorrect data that may be supplied by a credit bureau, can emerge from an
inaccurate inference being drawn from correct data.
3.2.2. BIAS AND DISCRIMINATION
Automated consumer credit scoring is not any different from judgmental
credit scoring in the sense that norms of judgment including biases deeply
entrenched in the society could affect the decision-making in both cases. 124
Stereotypical view of or blatant discriminations against a group could be
implemented using algorithms that, could “replic[ate] and even amplify human
biases.” 125 Regarding machine learning, Hacker identifies two main causes of
algorithmic biases: biased training and unequal ground truth. 126 Biased training
occurs from incorrect handling of data, such as implicit bias in assigning value
(output value) to certain data, or from biased selection of data for training. 127 It
could also result from historically biased training data that issued to train the
algorithm which is then applied to a particular group of the society which was not
considered during the machine training phase. 128 According to Hacker, a bias
For contrary evidence, see Adare et al., who assert that “[f]ace-to-face lenders reject Latinx and
African-American applications approximately 6% more often than they reject similarly situated
non-minority applicants for both purchase and refinance loans. In aggregate, our findings suggest
that from 2009 to 2015, lenders rejected 0.74 to 1.3 million Latinx and AfricanAmerican applications that would have been accepted except for discrimination. FinTech lenders,
on the other hand, do not discriminate at all in the decision to reject or accept a minority loan
application in our sample. This is consistent with algorithms acting in a profit-maximizing
manner. Because our findings with respect to rejections must rely on proxies for certain variables
utilized by the GSEs in approving loans, we note that these results are preliminary. But they
nevertheless point toward the possibility that fully automated underwriting may reduce the
incidence of discrimination in loan rejections.” ADAIR MORSE ET AL., CONSUMER-LENDING
DISCRIMINATION IN THE FINTECH ERA 7 (2019).
125
Nicole Lee Turner et al., Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and Polices
to Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS (May 22,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-bestpractices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/. For more information on human and machine
biases, see generally Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q. J. OF
ECON. 237, 237-93 (2018).
126
Hacker, supra note 90, at 1146.
127
Id. at 1147.
128
Id. at 1148 (“This is precisely what happened in a real case concerning applications to a UK
medical school. For historical reasons, previously successful candidates happened to be
predominantly white males; the model thus ranked white males higher when screening new
candidates.”).
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resulting from unequal ground truth (the best approximation of reality) occurs when
a trait that disparately impacts a particular group is used as a substitute variable in
the decision making. 129 This constitutes what is referred to as proxy discrimination,
which may be a result of conscious decision or implicit bias. 130
While some indications of bias in automated credit scoring are reported, 131
today, there are not many documented cases of internationally discriminatory
algorithms in the credit industry. 132 In 2009, American Express allegedly reduced
the credit facility of Kevin Johnson, a Black American marketing and
communication firm owner, although he had reportedly no bad credit history. 133 In
its letter, the company stated that Johnson had shopped in a store which was
patronized by people with poor payment history, which led to the decision to lower
his credit facility. 134 Since the company did not state the specific store, “the only
shopping trip [that Johnson could] determine was out of the ordinary was a
See id. at 1148-49.
See id (“. . . simply eliminating sensitive attributes from the model does not guarantee nondiscrimination… redundant encoding makes it both more likely and harder to detect, as
correlations multiply and discrimination hides behind seemingly neutral factors picked up by the
algorithm.”).
131
See Will Knight, Biased Algorithms Are Everywhere, and No One Seems to Care, MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (July 12, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608248/biasedalgorithms-are-everywhere-and-no-one-seems-to-care/ (noting the observation of
an algorithmic bias author that "even those who know their algorithms are at a risk of bias are
more interested in the bottom line than in rooting out bias.”); see
also Nicholas Diakopoulos, What a Report from Germany Teaches Us About Investigating
Algorithms, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Jan.
10, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/investigating-algorithims-germanyschufa.php (discussing algorithmic bias of German Schufa score calculation and algorithmic
accountability reporting as “an attempt to uncover the power wielded by algorithmic decisionmaking systems and shed light on their biases, mistakes, or misuse.”).
132
In this regard, there are findings that machine-learning-driven loan underwriting is less
discriminatory and more inclusive. Researchers at the University of California Berkeley have
concluded that minority groups in the US, i.e., African-Americans and Latinx, face less
discrimination in FinTech mortgage lending than in face-to-face mortgage
lending. Robert P. Bartlett, et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era 2, 4 (UC
Berkeley Pub. Law, Research
Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3063448.
133
See Ron Lieber, American Express Kept a (Very) Watchful Eye on Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/your-money/credit-and-debitcards/31money.html; Carrie Teegardin, Whatever Happened to Kevin D. Johnson, Part
of Credit Card Debate, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Aug. 11, 2012),
https://www.ajc.com/business/whatever-happened-kevin-johnson-part-credit-carddebate/cUneC23EknwhzHKe1nP4pI/.
134
“Other customers who have used their card at establishments where you recently shopped have
a poor repayment history with American Express.” Teegardin, supra note 133.
129
130
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September visit to a Wal-Mart in Southeast Atlanta. It was the first time he had
used his American Express card at that store.” 135 Kevin Johnson’s story does not
conclusively prove intentional discrimination. Moreover, publicly available
evidence does not show whether the company took factors other than shopping
pattern into account.
In 2019, the Finnish Data Protection Authority issued a decision against a
credit company, Svea Ekonomi, for setting its algorithmic credit risk assessment to
automatically reject credit applicants over a certain age (the applicant, Mr. Krister
Linden, was age 83 by the relevant date). 136 This case shows a clear intent to
discriminate against certain applicants based on age, executed by Svea Ekonomi,
which is a prohibited practice in the EU. 137 Nevertheless, the practice is not
pervasive and systemic in the credit industry.
3.2.3. THE RISKS OF AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT—A RECAP
The preceding sections have examined the benefits and challenges of
automated consumer credit scoring. Inaccuracy and bias/discrimination are
identified as two important challenges. While literature proposes technical
solutions to tackle them, 138 this article compares the solutions available in the EU
and the US.
The US has not implemented specific law governing automated consumer
credit scoring, and yet, there are legal rules responding to the phenomenon
providing comparable consumer protection. With the aim of proving that the US
Chris Cuomo, et al., ‘GMA' Gets Answers: Some Credit Card Companies Financially Profiling
Customers, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/TheLaw/gma-answerscredit-card-companies-financially-profiling-customers/story?id=6747461.
136
Finnish DPA Ordered a Company to Change their Data Processing Practises, GDPR
REGISTER (May 22, 2019), https://www.gdprregister.eu/gdpr/data-processing-practises/.
137
The EU Consumer Credit Directive, Recital 45 professes to incorporate the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Directive 2008/48, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 23 April 2008 on Credit Agreements for Consumers and Repealing Council
Directive 87/102/EEC, 2008 O.J. (L 133) 66; See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 3 (including articles on protection of personal data, right
to property, and non-discrimination). The applicability of EU non-discrimination law in the
consumer credit market is well-established. See generally IRIS BENOHR, EU CONSUMER LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 130 (2013).
138
See generally David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 703-05 (2017) (arguing for
addressing potential bias and discrimination at the state of training the algorithm through various
techniques in addition to through rules that govern the machine learning decision at the stage of
deployment).
135
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has flexible consumer credit laws responding to the risk of automated consumer
credit underwriting, comparable to the one in the EU, the ensuing section examines
the most pertinent legal rules in the two jurisdictions.
4. EFFECTIVE CONSUMER PROTECTION IN AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT
SCORING IN THE EU AND THE US
Legal literature has maintained that consumers are protected better in the
EU in the field of automated credit scoring than their US counterparts. 139 Hertza
provides an overview of the key provisions of the GDPR that he claims provide
stronger consumer protection related to access to credit, emphasizing GDPR
provisions governing consent and transparency. 140 Before examining the
requirements of consent and transparency in the EU and the US, it is necessary to
first analyze the GDPR’s rules regarding the general prohibition of individual ADM
and the exceptions thereof as consent and transparency requirements emerge from
these rules.
4.1.

GDPR’S GENERAL PROHIBITION OF SOLELY (INDIVIDUAL) ADM

The GDPR establishes that the data subject has the right not to be subjected
solely to ADM that produces legal effects concerning them or similarly
significantly affects them. 141 There are three exceptions to this prohibition of solely
ADM. Pursuant to these exceptions, a solely ADM with legal effect or a similarly
significant effect is permitted first, with the consent of the consumer, and second
when the ADM is necessary for the formation or performance of a contract. 142 In
both cases, the data controller must put in place measures to safeguard the data
subjects’ rights, freedoms and legitimate interests including the right to obtain
human intervention, express their point of view, and contest the decision. 143 Third,
a solely automated decision is permitted if authorized by EU law or law of a
Member State to which the data controller is a subject. 144
The GDPR’s general prohibition of purely ADM including machine
learning decisions presents three main challenges. First, if consumers are to be
requested to provide consent for ADM regarding all matters (as consent is one of
the requirements), it creates an unnecessary burden on businesses that should solicit
Hertza, supra note 10, at 1730.
Id. at 1729-41.
141
GDPR at Art. 22(1).
142
GDPR at Art. 22(1) & (2).
143
GDPR at Art. 22(3).
144
GDPR at Art. 22(2) (b).
139
140
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consent even when the risk involved in applying ADM in question is appreciably
low. The consent requirement has also other practical challenges examined in detail
later (see infra § 4.2.1). Second, the GDPR does not provide a guideline on when a
decision is necessary for the formation or performance of a contract, which may
lead to uncertainty for businesses and consumers alike. Third, the possibility for
allowing ADM if authorized by the Member States results in inconsistent
implementation in different Member States.
According to a report published in 2019, only nine Member states used the
derogation provision by allowing ADM without the consumer’s consent in certain
instances. 145 Although the other Member States may implement the derogation rule
in the future, 146 the uncertainty this may cause to businesses operating in different
Member States cannot be underestimated. This derogation rule can also be
implemented to undermine consumer rights. The way in which this rule is
implemented in Germany and the UK clearly demonstrates how a country may
implement stringent or loose rules permitting ADM without the consumer’s prior
consent although not making the consumer better off in either case.
In Germany, solely ADM is allowed when consented to by the consumer or
when necessary for the formation or performance of a contract as permitted under
Article 22(2) (a) &(c) of the GDPR. 147 Germany implemented Article 22(2) (b) to
allow ADM, i.e., without the consumer’s consent only in case of insurance service
contracts where the request of the individual (consumer) is granted. 148 This
provision under German GDPR implementing law is interpreted to apply, among
others, to cases of reimbursement and compensation under an insurance policy.149
This approach limits solely ADM to two cases. The first one is pursuant to the
insurance service contract where the outcome of the decision is positive (the request
of the data subject was granted). 150 The second one is where the decision is “based
on the application of binding rules of remuneration for therapeutic treatment and
145
Access Now, One year under the EU GDPR: An Implementation Progress Report- State of the
Play, Analysis and Recommendations 10 (May 2019),
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2019/06/One-Year-Under-GDPR.pdf (noting that
Germany “provides for sectorial exceptions, notably in the insurance context. Automated
decisions can be used without individual consent and appeal mechanisms if the individual’s
request is granted (e.g., receives the full value of a claim).”).
146
Id. at 9.
147
Gianclaudio Malgieri, Automated decision-making in the EU Member States: The right to
explanation and other “suitable safeguards” in the national legislations, Computer Law &
Security Review Volume 35(5), 1-26 (2019) at 7.
148
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz vom 30. Juni 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2097).translated in
https://www.gesetze hereafter” BDSD.”
149
See Gianclaudio Malgieri, supra note 147, at 7.
150
BDSG at Art. 37(1) (1).
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the data controller takes suitable measures in the event that the request is not
granted in full, to safeguard the data subject's legitimate interests, at least the right
to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point
of view and to contest the decision.” 151 In this case, the data controller has the duty
to inform “the data subject of these rights no later than the notification indicating
that the data subject’s request will not be granted in full.” 152
The German approach that restricts solely ADM to insurance service
contracts can certainly be regarded as a cautious approach that reduces the potential
adverse effects of algorithmic decisions. However, it also unnecessarily restricts
algorithmic decisions even in cases where the risk of harm could be appreciably
low and could stifle innovation. There are countless scenarios in which a fully
ADM may lead to a positive outcome for the data subject. Under the current
German approach, individual ADM is not allowed even under those circumstances
because of how Germany implemented the GDPR. To be fair, the exclusive focus
on the implementation of the GDPR does not provide a complete picture of
permitted cases of fully ADM in Germany. In the realm of administrative decisions,
ADM is allowed in tax assessment in Germany based on specific statutes. 153 The
scope of permitted cases of a solely automated decision can also be expanded by
law as the very purpose of GDPR Article 22(2) (b) seems to achieve this— allowing
Member States to evaluate sectors/cases in which they want to allow solely ADM
and authorize it by law. Nevertheless, the choice of insurance service contracts, no
matter what the justification, does not seem to be reasonable.
The UK approach is on the other extreme. In the UK, GDPR Article 22(2)
(b) is implemented more liberally. Accordingly, significant fully automated
decisions, meaning decisions that produce a legal effect or similarly significant
effect on the data subject, which are not based on the consent of the data subject or
necessary for the formation or performance of contract are allowed in any sector
subject to ex post facto procedural safeguards. 154
Pursuant to the relevant provision of the UK Data Protection Act (2018), a
fully automated decision is permitted provided that, (a) the data controller, as soon
as reasonably practicable, notifies the data subject in writing that a decision has
BDSG at Art. 37(1) (2).
Id. at Art. 37(1) (2).
153
Marlies van Eck, Automated administrative decisions and the law: Governments are using
computers to make decisions in individual cases. How is this practice regulated? (September
2018), https://automatedadministrativedecisionsandthelaw.wordpress.com/2018/09/03/automateddecisions-and-administrative-law-germany/
154
UK Data Protection Act (2018) at Art. 14.
151
152
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been taken based solely on automated processing. 155 “The data subject may, before
the end of the period of 1 month beginning with receipt of the notification, request
the data controller to—(i) reconsider the decision, or (ii) take a new decision that is
not based solely on automated processing.” 156
Within a maximum of one month, subject to extension by two more months
for a justifiable reason, the data controller must (a) consider the request, including
any information provided by the data subject that is relevant to it, (b) comply with
the request, and (c) by notice in writing inform the data subject of— (i) the steps
taken to comply with the request, and (ii) the outcome of complying with the
request. 157
The provisions of the UK Data Protection Act implementing article 22(2)
(b) of the GDPR in contrast with the sectoral approach in Germany, 158 adopts a
more liberal approach, permitting fully automated decisions in all sectors subject
to ex post facto procedural safeguards. While the German approach restricts
automated decisions needlessly, the UK approach could potentially expose
consumers and the public to arbitrary algorithmic decisions even in cases where the
risk of harm is high. The ex post facto procedural safeguards may be abused by data
controllers who may not necessarily disclose that the decision in question is made
by an algorithm. If this happens, there is no way for the consumer to exercise the
right to request for reconsideration of the decision.
In the UK, algorithmic decisions could be used in sensitive areas where the
public has a strong interest in ensuring accuracy, fairness, and transparency. In
2019, legal action was instituted against the Home Office by the Joint Council for
the Welfare of Immigrants, due to its use of an algorithm that allegedly
discriminated against visa applicants based on race/nationality. 159 This algorithm
was allegedly used to classify visa applicants according to risk as red, amber, and
green. 160 The Home Office decided to scrap the algorithm in question in 2020.

Id. at Art. 14(4) (a).
Id. at Art. 14(4) (b).
157
Id. at Art. 14(5).
158
See Gianclaudio Malgieri, supra note 147, at 7.
159
Henry McDonald, ‘Home Office to scrap 'racist algorithm' for UK visa applicants’, The
Guardian (August 4, 2020) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/aug/04/home-office-toscrap-racist-algorithm-for-uk-visa-applicants
160
The Joint Council for Welfare of Immigrants, ‘We won! Home Office to stop using racist visa
algorithm’ (2020) https://www.jcwi.org.uk/news/we-won-home-office-to-stop-using-racist-visaalgorithm
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Several local Councils use algorithms in decisions relating to welfare benefits. 161 It
is questionable whether the existing procedural safeguards are sufficient to protect
consumers from potentially arbitrary decisions made even in loan underwriting. At
the very least, if the decision-makers comply with the duty to inform the consumer
of the nature of the decision, the consumer might be able to contest the decision
and secure human intervention, although the consumer might lose based on
procedural error (failure to contest the decision in a month) or may carry a
significant financial burden while challenging the decision including before a court.
The UK approach to the implementation of the GDPR clearly demonstrates
that the EU’s much commended legal regime does not necessarily protect the
consumer from ADM as it can be implemented to allow solely ADM in a broad
range of areas. A non-complying data controller could utilize ADM without the
consent of the data controller and without establishing that the decision is necessary
for the formation or performance of a contract under Article 14(UK), by putting in
place procedural safeguards whether or not those procedural safeguards are
genuinely meant to protect the consumer. In the case of machine learning decisions,
the safeguards may not be adequately implemented in the first place (see infra §
5.1) Such as system cannot be proposed as a model system of law for consumer
protection. In the proceeding sub-section, the requirements of consent and
transparency that are regarded as instrumental in protecting the consumer are
analyzed.
4.2.

CONSENT AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

The GDPR is commended for giving data subjects control over their
personal data, 162 in part through strict consent rules. Under the GDPR, the provision
that consent should be secured for one or more specified reasons is one of six
provisions, one of which must apply for the processing of personal data to be
legal. 163 The GDPR requires that if consent is given in a “written declaration which
also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner
which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily
Sarah Marsh, ‘One in three councils using algorithms to make welfare decisions’, The
Guardian (October 15, 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/oct/15/councils-usingalgorithms-make-welfare-decisions-benefits
162
I van Ooijen & Helena U. Vrabec, Does the GDPR Enhance Consumers’ Control over Personal
Data? An Analysis from a Behavioural Perspective, 42 J. OF CONSUMER POL’Y91, 92-93, 10304 (2019) (assessing the degree to which the GDPR gives consumers control over their data,
finding that the GDPR does enhance individual control, but contains deficiencies that selfregulatory instruments may regulate).
163
See 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (listing the six factors of lawful personal data processing under GDPR
Article 6(1), one of which must apply).
161
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accessible form, using clear and plain language.” 164 More notably, ADM is
permitted if necessary for the formation or performance of a contract, authorized
by law or consented to by the data subject. 165 The consumer also has the right to
withdraw their consent at any time. 166 In arguing that these consent rules enhance
better consumer protection in the EU, Hertza states:
While recognizing that there is no silver bullet to
solve the difficult issues facing the consumer credit
industry, this section identifies some ways in which
the GDPR could inspire consumer credit legislation
reforms. Big data and AI could increase the number
of people that have access to credit. However, the
discriminatory impact of the new technologies will
outweigh the benefits, unless consumer credit
regulation grants consumers access rights to the data
used to determine their creditworthiness, and also
grants consumers the right to deny access to certain
personal data. The first steps required to achieve this
goal are to extinguish the CRA versus non-CRA
distinction up to a certain point, and to strengthen
consent requirements and the right to refuse access
to personal data. 167
4.2.1. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS APPROACH TO DATA PROTECTION IN THE
EU AND CONSENT
Data protection law in Europe is based on the conception that data
protection is a fundamental right, 168 something the GDPR upholds. 169 Thus, the
stringent consent requirements of the GDPR are crafted in this context.
Nevertheless, the notion that stringent consent requirements would enhance
consumer protection in algorithmic credit scoring is based on abstract analysis of
the law. First, the EU consumers do not benefit from consent requirements as much
2016 O.J. (L 119) 37.
Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European
Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMMC’N
TECH. L. 65, 91 (2019).
166
2016 O.J. (L 119) 37.
167
Hertza, supra note 10, at 1734 (emphasis added).
168
See STEFANO RODOTÀ, REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 77, 80-81 (S. Gutwirth et al. eds.,
2009); Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y. U. L. REV. 771, 77374 (2019).
169
Hoofnagle et al., supra note 165, at 79, 89.
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as assumed or expected. Second, the fact that the consumer’s data is obtained by a
financial institution with consent has no causal link to how their data is processed
in many cases.
Several factors contribute to the ineffectiveness of EU data protection
consent rules. Research suggests that due to the sophistication of privacy policies
and the complex systems of data collection coupled with the consumers’ limited
cognitive ability to process information, consumers do not have sufficient
informational control. 170 First, data collection consent forms (terms and conditions)
or privacy policies are adhesion contracts where the data subjects have no power to
bargain. 171 Despite the GDPR requirement that consent be specific, informed,
unambiguous, given freely, and entail affirmative action by the consumer,
researchers argue that there are still challenges that weaken the consumers’
control. 172 At the stage of collection, due to cognitive limitations, as well as the
large volume of information, consumers are not able to properly filter and process
information to make informed decisions. 173 Even if privacy agreements were
negotiable, consumers would not have the time to adequately scrutinize them due
to information overload and challenges to understanding technical jargon. 174
A 2015 survey conducted by Eurobarometer (under the request of the
European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers) shows that
the majority of respondents do not read privacy policies because they are too long,
or because they are unclear or too difficult to understand, while a small percentage
of the respondents simply assume that the law provides protection, or find it
sufficient that there is a privacy policy on the website of the data controller. 175 This
means that the majority of consumers could sign a privacy policy that might allow
ADM without knowing it.

Ooijen & Vrabec, supra note 162, at 96.
See Michiel Rhoen, Beyond Consent: Improving Data Protection Through Consumer Protection
Law, 5 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 3 (2016).
172
Ooijen & Vrabec, supra note 162 at 100, 103-04.
173
Id. at 94-95.
174
Id. at 95 ("a Norwegian campaign-group established that it took almost 32 hours to read the
terms and conditions of 33 representative smartphone apps . . . Note that this was solely the time it
took to read the texts, let alone reflecting on the consequences of agreement to such policies.").
175
Special Eurobarometer 431: Data Protection Report, at 87-88 (June
2015), http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_en.pdf.
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One year after the GDPR was implemented, Eurobarometer published
another survey in June 2019. 176 According to this survey conducted in all EU
Member states, 37% of the participants responded that they do not read online
privacy policies at all, while 47% and 13% read them partially and fully
respectively. 177 Those who read privacy policies partially or do not read them at all
indicated that privacy policies are too long (66%) unclear and difficult to
understand (31%). 178 Some responded that it is sufficient for them to know that the
entity they are dealing with has privacy policy(17%) while others believe that they
would be protected by law anyway(15%) whereas others believe that websites will
not honor privacy terms(10%). 179
Privacy policies have gotten more complex as business methods become
more sophisticated and businesses have become more aggressive with the
realization of the economic value of personal data and the increased ability to
collect it, process it, and make predicative analysis at a cheaper cost. 180 So,
consumers accept terms and conditions for multiple online apps and transactions
with no desire to waste their time reading complex non-negotiable privacy policies.
Financial institutions can amend their terms and conditions unilaterally and send an
electronic contract that the user has no meaningful control over. Those who read
and understand can do little to change terms they do not like.
Recently, the CJEU handed down a judgment which specifies that internet
sites cannot set cookies policies to require positive action for the consumer to optout of cookie based-tracking of the consumer behavior. 181 The judgment should
address the rampant and continuous tracking of consumers’ behavior for marketing
purposes by requiring the consumer to untick pre-selected checkboxes. 182 When
consumers that browse the internet are subject to surveillance by private companies
who can access personal data and share it with third parties unless the consumer
goes through pre-selected boxes to untick them, it is naïve to think that consent
requirement is protecting consumers in the EU. Even after the judgment of the

Special Eurobarometer 487a: General Data Protection Regulation Report, at 1 (June
2019), https://privacyblogfullservice.huntonwilliamsblogs.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/28/2019/06/ebs487a_en.pdf.
177
Id.at 47.
178
Id. at 51.
179
Id.
180
See Jennifer Shore & Jill Steinman, Did you really agree to that? The evolution of Facebook’s
privacy, TECH. SCI., (Aug. 10, 2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015081102.
181
See Case C-673/17, Planet49, 2019 EU:C:2019:801.
182
See Klaus Wiedemann, The ECJ’s Decision in ‘‘Planet49’’ (Case C-673/17): A Cookie Monster
or Much Ado About Nothing?, 51 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 543, 544 (2020).
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CJEU, the cookies practices have not changed in the EU based on the author’s
personal encounter with hundreds of websites on weekly basis.
Based on the Eurobarometer report and consumer behavior, as well business
practice, it is fair to conclude that overwhelming majority of the consumers have
no control over their data. The stringent consent requirement of the GDPR is
nothing more than a procedural requirement that ignores substantive consideration
of whether the consumer has real opportunity to bargain and change the privacy
related clauses. 183 Thus scholars who provide a cursory overview of the GDPR’s
provisions without investigating the actual practice have the onus of proving how
the consent requirement protects the consumer in automated consumer credit
scoring.
4.2.2. MARKET ORIENTED APPROACH TO DATA PROTECTION IN THE US
AND NOTICE AND CHOICE
In the US, data privacy is treated as a good that is subject to trading in the
market rather than a right that merits a constitutional protection. 184 Nevertheless, a
consent requirement, although not consistent across states and sectors and
admittedly softer, is not entirely lacking. Data Privacy law in the US is sectoral 185
and governed by a combination of federal and state laws. The sectoral nature of US
data privacy law is also a key feature of privacy law at state levels. For instance,
California has different privacy laws for different sectors that require consent
(notice and choice) for data collection and sharing with third parties, 186 despite
California implementing a new privacy act. 187
US privacy law is different from its EU counterpart in its philosophical
foundation which prioritizes innovation over protection of data privacy rights,
narrow definition of privacy harm and lack of a single enforcement agency, to
mention the most important facets. 188 In line with this, consent mechanism in the
See Rhoen, supra note 171, at 6; see also STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND
POLICY 85 (2d ed. 2013).
184
See Paul M. Schwartz & Kark-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO.
L.J. 117, 132 (2017).
185
See Schwartz, supra note 30 at 903-04.
186
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (2006); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4050 (2012).
187
The California Constitutional Privacy Act applies to businesses with gross annual revenue or
more than $25 million or businesses that buy, receive or sell the personal information of 50,000 or
more consumers, households or devices. Compared to the GDPR, this is an odd way of designing
privacy law that excludes many actors that can engage in invasion and breach of consumer
privacy. See CAL. CONS. PRIV. ACT §1798.140(d) (A) & (B).
188
See Barret, supra note 30, at 1065-81.
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US, more accurately referred to as notice and choice 189 is regarded as soft. 190
Companies generally provide notice to the consumer on take-it-or-leave-it basis191
whereas on paper, drafting adhesive privacy policy is not allowed under the GDPR.
In the field of consumer financial services, consent requirement is relatively
comprehensive in the US as well. The GLBA has provisions that require financial
institutions to protect the confidentiality and security of consumers’ data, and
requires them to provide notice to the consumer if they wish to disclose information
to a third party. 192 The GLBA applies to financial institutions that provide loan,
investment and insurance services. 193 It imposes an obligation on financial
institutions to provide notice about the type of non-public personal information
collected about the consumer, the origin of such information, as well as affiliated
and non-affiliated third parties with whom the information may be shared. 194
Financial institutions are also obliged to inform the consumer of their right to opt
out of the personal data sharing with non-affiliated third parties through a
reasonable method and in a reasonable time. 195 Another relevant federal statute that
governs consent is the FCRA which applies to Credit Reporting Agencies. The
FCRA notice rule allows the consumer to opt out of disclosure by credit reporting
agencies of their personal data to third parties. 196
One of the most significant US legal rules on data privacy is found in the
FTC Act. Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the agency the power to institute
enforcement actions for unfair and deceptive trade practices. 197 The FTC has used
its authority under section 5 to sanction data controllers for misrepresenting their
privacy policy including not honoring them or not disclosing the exact scope of
collection of the consumers’ data. 198
See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1880 (2013).
190
Id. at 1071.
191
Id. at 1073.
192
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501-505, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
193
See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3) (2012).
194
See How to Comply with the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N 7, (2000), https://www ftc.gov/tips-advice/businesscenter/guidance/how-comply-privacy-consumer-financial-information-rule-gramm.
195
Id. at 9.
196
See Fair Credit Reporting Act, FED. DEP. INS. CO., (2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/8/viii-6.1.pdf.
197
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) & (2). With respect to banks and financial institutions, this provision is
enforced by other supervisory authorities including the Office of Currencies and Comptrollers.
198
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Consent Order in the Matter of My Space LLC, File No. 102 3058,
3 (2012), https://www ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/05/120508myspaceorder.p
189
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The review of privacy notice rules in the US leads to three main
conclusions. First, although the US notice system is critiqued for leaving room for
consumers to accept adhesive contracts, the system does give the consumer the right
not to disclose their data, unless the specific purpose for data collection, processing,
and sharing are disclosed. In this context, consumers need to consent to ADM for
a specific purpose. Second, the default rule in various sectoral statutes is that the
data controller may share the data with third parties unless the consumer decides to
opt out. This makes the consent system weaker in the US than the EU. 199
Overall, in the US, although the requirement of consent is certainly not as
stringent as in the EU in dictating the manner of framing the consent form, the US
does protect the consumer in the field of consumer credit scoring. Even if there
were gaps in consent requirement, the GDPR does not serve as a benchmark
because even under its umbrella, consumers only have the illusion of control over
their personal data. Only a handful of consumers may prevent businesses from
getting their data for purposes they do not approve of, and only a tiny minority
might negotiate to change privacy policies (if at all). Finally, only a handful of
consumers would be able to bring legal action for breach of their privacy rights.
Last but not the least, even if it were assumed that US financial institutions
could make automated decisions with consent obtained through adhesion contracts,
that does not allow them to make inaccurate or discriminatory decisions. They
cannot refuse to provide explanation to the consumers ex post facto. There are
multiple effective sanctions imposed on CRAs for inaccurate reporting in the US
which clearly demonstrates that consent in data collection and sharing does not
necessarily provide a blessing for all sorts of subsequent decisions. 200

df; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, Agreement on Consent in the Matter of Searr Holding
Management, File No. 082 3099 4-5 (2009).
199
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE
OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10 (2014) (“Disclosure is a ritual to be endured: patients are
“consented,” borrowers sign their way through closings, smartphone users “accept” terms, and
Internet users are informed of privacy policies through linked scrolls. How can we not alter the
white noise of disclosure? Lawmakers then turn up the volume to get our attention, and we close
our ears to the din. In short, mandated disclosure seems plausible only on logically reasonable but
humanly false assumptions. When buying software online, how many people click to read the
terms of sale, much less read them, much less try to understand them, and much less succeed?”).
200
See discussion infra section 4.2.2.
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4.3

TRANSPARENCY AND AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING
4.3.1. THEORIES OF TRANSPARENCY

Another facet of the regulation of algorithmic decision-making is
transparency which is regarded as an important component of ensuring algorithmic
accountability. This sub-section overviews various theories of transparency in
ADM and analyzes the legal rules on transparency in the EU and the US.
The debate regarding the scope of transparency required in automated credit
scoring or even its necessity at all is polarized. 201 The reason for demanding
transparency in ADM is ensuring that the decision maker explains its decisionmaking system to the consumer, the public and is held accountable for adverse
decisions. 202 Transparency enhances consumer confidence in the system and
provides the basis for accountability. 203 Nevertheless, how much should decision
maker disclose? Is it possible to explain algorithmic decision in all circumstances?
On these questions, there are three main theories that may serve as a basis for
methodical analysis of this issue: (1) the black box, (2) the disparate impact, and
(3) the opacity theories.
This article argues that neither the GDPR, nor the relevant rules in the US
promote an optimal level of consumer protection because of the problem of
explainability in machine learning.
A.

The Black Box Theory

The black box theory has been dominant in legal literature and merits a
serious scrutiny due to its uncompromising demand for transparency. To the best
of the author’s knowledge, the theory is pioneered, or at least expounded by Frank
Pasquale who describes an algorithmic decision as a system where the input and
output is known but how one becomes the other is unknown and calls for
transparency in the logic of algorithms. 204 To achieve transparency under this
theory, the decision makers should disclose, not only the input data used for the
decision but also the output as well as the decisions tree (the weighing process for
In one camp, scholars call for complete transparency. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK
BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 7
(2015). On the other extreme, some scholars consider opacity to be the guiding principle for
automated decisions. See Kroll et al, supra note 76, at 664-713.
202
See generally PASQUALE, supra note 201.
203
Id.
204
See PASQUALE, supra note 201, at 8; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 67 (2016).
201
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various variables) that should provide a clear account of how the algorithm
functions and eventually to ensure algorithmic accountability 205 as well as
algorithm auditing, 206 and transparency (as an end in itself). 207
The black box approach has at least three essential requirements. First, the
existence of ADM must be disclosed to the consumer. 208 Second, disclosure in
cases of actual decision give information regarding the input and output as well as
the logic involved in getting one from the other. 209 Third, the default rule of trade
secret law that protects proprietary algorithms should change from assumption of
secrecy to expectation of people’s right to know. 210
The black box approach has many objectives. Among others, it aims to
subject algorithms to scrutiny of consumers impacted by algorithmic decisions and
to allow public authorities to oversee algorithms through testing and auditing.211
The black box theory aims to enhance the maximum transparency possible, whether
it can achieve its objective is questionable. To be sure, the legal system in the EU
and the US is not prepared to force disclosure of computer source codes to the
consumer, to public enforcement authorities and to the judiciary. 212 Neither is the
default rule of secrecy for proprietary algorithms reversed in both jurisdictions.
Opponents of this view also point out the impracticality of the approach for several
reasons (see infra 4.2.1.B).
B.

The Opacity Theory

The opacity school of thought, holding that transparency in algorithmic
decision making is not necessary, argues that algorithmic fairness can be achieved
See Kroll et al, supra note 76, at 664-713.
Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 189, 197 (2017).
207
See Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Prediction, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1504-70 (2013);
see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 201, at 20; Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to
Automated Authority, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 235-6 (2011); Edith
Ramirez, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum: Privacy Challenges in
the Era of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair, FED. TRADE COMM’N 8 (Aug. 19,
2013) https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-bigdata-view-lifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf.
208
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 204.
209
See id. at 26; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249–
1313 (2007); see also Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014).
210
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 204, at 21.
211
Id. at 26.
212
Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.713
(2000).
205
206
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without being fully legally transparent. 213 According to this view, full transparency
is not useful on the grounds that it (a) could enable people “game the system”, 214
(b) is impossible due to trade secret law protecting algorithms, 215 and (c) may not
necessarily lead to the understanding of how the algorithm functions. 216 In the
context of machine learning, the theory holds that full disclosure is unhelpful
because with every query and dataset, the software updates its decision making,
and hence the existing decision rules become outdated, thereby rendering the
disclosed information purposeless. 217
The opacity theory suggests procedural regularity in ADM can be achieved
by technical tools of software testing conducted feasibly only by industry experts
and possibly in a self-regulation setting. 218 The opacity theory emphatically
advocates for secrecy in algorithmic decision-making. 219
From the consumer’s perspective, the technical tools of transparency
suggested by the opacity theory do not enhance true transparency. One of the
proposed cryptographic techniques of transparency is Zero-Knowledge Proof
(ZKP) —"protocols that enable one entity (called the prover) to convince another
entity (called the verifier) of the validity of a mathematical statement, without
revealing anything beyond the assertion of the statement.” 220 In its ideal function
ZKP is supposed to ensure that the public knows that a decision is made according
to a specific procedure and would have a specific outcome, and the decision maker
Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 657-60; see also Zarsky, supra note 207, at 1504-70.
Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 657-60; see also Christian Sandvig, et al, Auditing Algorithms:
Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms, Data and Discrimination:
Converting Critical Concerns into Productive Inquiry9 (2014),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b722/7cbd34766655dea10d0437ab10df3a127396.pdf?_ga=2.767
79484.892963938.1581377623-552105405.1575505643 (“A major problem is that the public
interest disclosure of just algorithms might be likely to produce serious negative consequences. On
many platforms the algorithm designers constantly operate a game of cat-and-mouse with those
who would abuse or ‘game’ their algorithm. These adversaries may themselves be criminals (such
as spammers or hackers) and aiding them could conceivably be a greater harm than detecting
unfair discrimination in the platform itself.”).
215
See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice System, 70 STANFORD L. REV.1344 (2018).
216
Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 638; see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify:
A Guide to Algorithm and the Law, 31 HARVARD J. L. & TECH. 1, 33-34 (2018).
217
Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 660 (“Online machine learning systems update their decision
rules after every query, meaning that any disclosure will be obsolete as soon as it is made.”).
218
Id. at 662-69.
219
Id. at 662.
220
Rafael Pass, Alternative Variants of Zero-Knowledge Proofs (2004) (Licentiate Thesis, Cornell
Computer Science).
213
214
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is supposed to demonstrate that information without revealing anything that is
considered a secret. 221
If the decision making is challenged before court, an oversight body can
compel the decision maker to demonstrate that the decision complies with the
commitment they made publicly. 222 To summarize, the opacity theory calls for a
default secrecy rule with limited transparency, implemented in a form of selfcertification. As conceded by the proponents themselves, many of the tools are
expensive, 223 and none of them encourage the disclosure of the source code to the
public without putting in place protective mechanisms to guard trade secrets. 224
The opacity theory is flawed on several levels. Its key drawback is the
excessive dependence on self-regulation where the regulated entities’ words and
commitments are to be taken for granted until a consumer challenges a given
decision-making process, at which point it would be subjected to third-party
scrutiny. This theory is only as good as what companies are willing to do to be
transparent.
There is some evidence from regulatory history that self-regulation or selfcertification is not effective model of regulation. Before the 2008 global financial
crisis, one of the credit rating agencies, Moody’s, was reported to have had an error
in its rating model—leading to triple A rating for assets with higher default risk.225
Rather than correcting the error and rating the asset accordingly, Moody’s only
adjusted its model to justify the previous mistaken rating. 226 Credit Rating
Agencies came under the spotlight largely due to the magnitude of the financial
crisis. It is difficult to understand why complex cryptographic commitments or
other technical tools of transparency will not be used by credit scoring companies
or financial institutions to make false claims until they are exposed due to a major
failure.

Kroll et al., supra note 76 at 668 (arguing that ZKP “allows decisionmakers to build audit logs,
which can be verified by the public to confirm that the decisionmaker applied the appropriate
policy to the correct input in order to reach the stated outcome, all without revealing the decision
policy itself and without revealing private data that might be included in the input or outcome.”).
222
Id. at 668-69.
223
Id. at 661.
224
Id. at 672-73.
225
Claire Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U.
PITT. L. REV. 585, 592 (2010).
226
Id. at 593.
221
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C.

The Disparate Impact Theory

The disparate impact theory assumes that full transparency is not necessary,
while also rejecting opacity. Thus, it demands the disclosure of the input and output
in the scoring system. 227 Chander argues that unlike what can be read in Pasquale’s
Black Box, the transparency in algorithm design, what is needed is transparency in
output and input. 228 His argument is that in the mysterious functioning of
algorithms, it is difficult to understand how a given input becomes an output, and
serves as the basis of a decision, whereas it is possible to determine what inputs are
used and what impacts they have. 229 He explains that by focusing on the input and
output, disparate impact of the outcome can be judged, and that is the only factor
that should be taken into account in deciding whether an algorithmic decision is
discriminatory or has a disparate impact on a specific group of consumers. 230
4.3.2. TRANSPARENCY—THE RULES IN THE EU AND THE US
There are appreciable differences in legislative framework and legal rules
governing transparency in automated consumer credit scoring in the EU and US.
In spite of that, the existing legal rules achieve similar results in both jurisdictions
in concrete cases.
A.

The EU Approach to Transparency

Under the GDPR, the data subject has “the right not to be subject to a
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces

227
Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm? 1041, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series
(Research Paper No. 498). Cf, with Talia Gillis, False Dreams of Algorithmic Fairness: The Case
of Credit Pricing, at 2 (Nov. 1, 2019)
https://scholar harvard.edu/files/gillis/files/gillis_jmp_191101.pdf (objecting to the disparate
impact theory); Zarsky, supra note 207, at 1563-1568 (proposing transparency as a partial solution
to be implemented both at data collection, analysis and policy decision making level. His analysis
focuses on government agencies and thus it does not necessarily fit the purpose of regulating
credit scoring).
228
Chander, supra note 227, at 1024.
229
Id. at 1024 (“What we need instead is a transparency of inputs and results, which allows us to
see that the algorithm is generating discriminatory impact. If we know that the results of an
algorithm are systematically discriminatory, then we know enough to seek to redesign the
algorithm or to distrust its results.”).
230
Id.
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legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”231
In cases where an automated decision is authorized it “should be subject to suitable
safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the
right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an
explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the
decision.” 232 In this context, the GDPR imposes a requirement of transparency at
three stages — (a) stage of data collection, (b) during data processing/decision, and
(c) post-data processing/decision. 233
The consumer has the right to know of the existence of automated decisions
and the anticipated consequences of such decisions at that stage of data
collection. 234 Furthermore, they have the right to obtain information as to whether
personal data about him/her is being processed, including the existence of
automated processing, the logic involved, and the significance and envisaged
consequence of such processing. 235 While the first right allows the consumer to
refuse consenting to automated processing of data, the second right allows the data
subject to withdraw consent. 236 Hence, these transparency requirements that the
GDPR put in place have the consequence of ensuring that the data subject is
informed of the possibility of ADM. Comandé and Malgieri describe this as an exante right to notification. 237 A third stage at which transparency is required in the
GDPR is post-automated decisions where the data subject has “the right to obtain
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view
and to contest the decision.” 238

GDPR Art. 22. Paragraph 2 recognizes exception, namely automated processing when
necessitated for entering into or performance of contract between the data subject and the data
controller and when allowed by the union’s law and based on the data subject’s consent.
232
Id. at recital 71.
233
Id. at art. 12.
234
Id. at art.13(2) (f). "In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the controller
shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with the following
further information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing: the existence of automated
decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those
cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the
envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.” Id. When personal data are not
obtained from the data subject, the corresponding provisions of Art. 14(2) (g) applies.
235
Id. at Art. 15(1) (h).
236
Id.
237
Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated DecisionMaking Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 243, 245
(2017).
238
GDPR at Art. 22(3).
231

40

The American Way—Until Machine Learning Algorithm Beats the Law?
In all three stages of the transparency requirements, it seems that the data
subject has the right to explanation under the GDPR, which would include the right
to get explanation of the logic involved in the ADM. 239 Whether the GDPR in fact
gives the right to explanation is debated, with some scholars disputing the existence
of such right due to, among others, its incorporation in recitals without being
reiterated in any of operative provision of the GDPR. 240
Recitals do not have autonomous binding force as they can only be used to
interpret the operative provisions of the legislation consistent with the spirit of the
legislation concerned. 241 The interpretive role that can be played by recital 71
which contains the right to explanation on ex post facto basis is explained by
Comandé and Maglieri, who argue that recital 71(a) does not derogate from, nor
amend article 22, rather it merely clarifies and supplements it, and thus when an
automated decision is made under article 22, the right to explanation is
exercisable. 242
The argument in favor of the right to explanation can be countered only
adopting a formalistic legal interpretation, which lacks support in jurisprudence of
the CJEU. 243 First, the right to explanation of the logic involved exists at the stage
of data collection and data access. There is no plausible explanation that same right
does not exist when the consumer wishes to challenge the same decision once it is
made. Furthermore, to argue that the right to explanation does not exist on an ex
post facto basis effectively nullifies right to contest, as contestation presupposes
explanation. Indeed, this line of understanding aligns with teleological
interpretation of law dominantly adopted by the CJEU where the meaning of a rule
is constructed in light to its purpose and the overall context. 244

Id. at recital 63. With respect to an ex post facto right to explanation, Art. 22 of the GDPR does
not give the data subject the right to an explanation. Id. at recital 71.
240
See Sandra Wachter, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not
Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L.76 (2017).
241
Malgieri and Comandé, supra note 237, at 254-55.
242
Id. at 255.
243
The dominant interpretive approach of the ECJ is teleological or purposive approach where the
Court interprets a given provision in the light of the objective, purpose, and overall context of the
law. See Kohen Lenaerts, Interpretation, and the Court of Justice: A Basis for Comparative
Reflection, 41 INT’L LAWYER 1011, 1017 (2007).
244
Id.; see also Giulio Itzcovich, The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of
Justice, 10 GERMAN L. REV. 538, 552 (2009).
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While the right to explanation exists under the GDPR, the challenge is lack
of clear ideas regarding the logic involved in automated processing. 245 Although
the GDPR seems to address the most problematic aspect—understanding how the
algorithmic decision-making works—by requiring the disclosure of the “the logic
involved in the automated processing,” it is far from sufficient to deal with the
challenge, as scholars still struggle to explain what exactly it requires.
Comandé and Malgieri identify two elements of the algorithmic decisionmaking process, namely the functionality (the logic of the algorithm), and the
contextual implementation of the functionality (with significance and the
consequence). 246 Interpreting the term logic as the architecture of the algorithm,
meaning its functionality, “significance and envisaged consequences” as the
implementation of the overall decision-making process, such as the purpose, impact
and human involvement, Comandé and Malgieri propose legibility—transparency
and comprehensibility in both aspects of the algorithm. 247 They also recognize that
trade secret law may limit legibility but suggest that it does not result in total denial
of disclosure of information (at least the ones that do not have an adverse effect on
the right of the data controller). 248
Trade secret protection is an important obstacle to transparency. While a
complete account is not provided here, it is worth highlighting the limiting effect
of trade secrets on algorithmic transparency. The GDPR grants the consumer the
right to explanation while maintaining that such right may not be exercised to the
detriment of trade secrets of businesses. 249 Despite the appearance of the trade
secret in recital 63 of the GDPR, 250 the GDPR has no specific operative provision
dedicated to reconciling the potential conflict between right explanation and the
need to preserve trade secrets. The EU Trade Secret Directive acknowledges that
trade secrets shall not affect fundamental rights, including the protection of
personal data. 251 Neither legal regime is clear as to where the protection of
fundamental rights ends, and trade secret protection begins or vice versa. 252
Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to Explanation' is
probably not the Remedy You are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 19, 49 (2017); see also
Lehr & Ohm, supra note 138, at 707-08.
246
Malgieri &Comandé, supra note 237, at 258.
247
Id. at 265.
248
Id.
249
GDPR at recital 63.
250
Id.
251
Council Directive 2016/943, recital 34, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1, 7.
252
Maja Brkean and Grégory Bonnet, Legal and Technical Feasibility of the GDPR’s Quest for
Explanation of Algorithmic Decisions: of Black Boxes, White Boxes and Fata Morganas, 11
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In 2014, the German Federal Court of Justice, based on the now-repealed
Data Protection Directive concluded that the data subject has the right to access all
their personal data used in credit scoring, but has no right to access (a) how the
scoring algorithm weighed various factors, and (b) how the reference groups used
to arrive at a credit score were comprised. 253 This essentially means that the
consumer has the right to access the inputs and the output, the latter as a natural
consequence of the decision being handed to the consumer. Under the directive, the
prevailing approach in Germany seems to be the disparate impact theory of
transparency where it is sufficient for the consumer to access the input and the
output without the need for disclosing the internal functioning of the algorithm. As
shown later, this is no different than what can be achieved using the provisions of
the FCRA in the US. 254 One caveat to be added is that the German Court decision
is based on the Data Protection Directive, not under the GDPR. 255 Nevertheless, the
wordings of the recitals in the two legal instruments on the role of trade secret in
limiting disclosure are identical. 256
In the unchartered territory of machine learning, the GDPR’s provisions on
the right to explanation are as helpless as any other old legal rule. The challenges
machine learning presents are multifaceted. Machine learning decisions could be
opaque to the consumers, to the financial institution, and even to the algorithmic
software creators themselves. In exceptional cases where machine learning credit
scoring is permitted (consented to, necessary for the formation or performance of
contract) 257 it may be employed. The seemingly comprehensive transparency rules
of the GDPR would serve no meaningful purpose in that case.
To conclude, the GDPR provisions on transparency are impracticable for
two reasons. First, trade secret law may be invoked not to disclose the internal logic
of the algorithm. So far, this has been the case under the previous data protection
EUROPEAN J. OF RISK REG. 18, 40 (2020) (“From a legal perspective, it therefore remains rather
unclear which set of rules should take precedence in case of conflict of trade secrets with data
subjects’ rights.”); see also Gianclaudio Malgieri, Trade Secrets v Personal Data: a possible
solution, 6 INT. DATA PRIVACY L. 102 (2016) (presenting additional optimistic approaches to the
relationship between transparency and trade secrets for algorithms).
253
Hunton Andews Kurt, Federal German Court Rules on Credit Scoring and Data Subject Access
Rights, HUNTON PRIV. BLOG (January 29, 2014)
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/01/29/federal-german-court-rules-credit-scoring-datasubject-access-rights/.
254
See infra ii (The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Transparency Provisions).
255
Kurt, supra note 253.
256
Cf. GDPR at recital 63; Council Directive 95/46/EC, recital 41, 1995 O.J. L. 281, 31, 35
(1995).
257
GDPR at art. 6(2) (a-c).
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law, at least in Germany. Given that the provisions governing ADM remained the
same under the GDPR, the likelihood that trade secret protection is invoked in a
similar fashion is high. Second, in case of machine learning credit scoring, it may
not actually be possible to disclose anything as the system can be a black box to all
stakeholders. Therefore, any reform proposal that calls for emulating the GDPR
regarding ADM does not take into consideration the practical obstacles that
undermine transparency and effective consumer protection.
B.

The US Approach to Transparency

In the US, there are no tailored legal regimes applicable to ADM including
in consumer credit scoring. Automated consumer credit scoring is governed by the
FCRA. 258 Before discussing the key transparency provisions of the FCRA, a brief
overview of the EU-US PS framework which extends the key principles of EU data
protection law to organizations operating in the US is useful as it underlines the
different regulatory approaches to ADM prevailing in the two jurisdictions.
i.

The EU-US Privacy Shield Framework

Due to the absence of comprehensive data protection law in the US, data
controllers transferring data from the EU to US should ensure that they process the
data by respecting the privacy rights of EU data subjects. The EU-US PS
Framework was created to achieve this purpose. 259 Although the EU Commission’s
adequacy decision regarding the PS Framework was struck down by the CJEU on
July 16, 2020, 260 its history and the manner in which it was structured provides an
excellent insight into how US consumer credit law addresses ADM. Under the PS
Framework, certain principles of the EU data protection law must be implemented
by the US organizations that wish to comply with the framework based on selfcertification. 261

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(g)(1)(B)(i-ii), 1681(a)(5)(D).
The EU-US Privacy Shield decision was adopted on July 12, 2016 and the Privacy Shield
framework became operational on August 1, 2016. See EU-US Data Transfers, EUROPA,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/eu-us-datatransfers_en.
260
See Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems, Case C‑311/18, n. 201
(July 16, 2020).
261
Council Implementing Decision 2016/1250, recital 14, 2016 O.J.L. 207, 1, 3 (July 12, 2016),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.207.01.0001.01.ENG.
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While the PS framework was not a complete extension of the EU data
protection law to participating organizations, the key principles of the GDPR are
restated and should be implemented. 262 Nevertheless, the Commission and the US
Department of Commerce decided not to add any of the rules of the GDPR
governing ADM in the PS framework. 263 According to the Commission’s adequacy
decision, ADM has limited application today and in areas where it occurs such as
in consumer lending, the existing US legal regimes provide specific protections
against adverse decisions. 264 The decision also indicated the need to closely
monitor the area as ADM is an evolving phenomenon. 265 Finally, the decision
anticipated a study to be conducted on ADM and to be presented as a part of the
first and second annual review of the PS Framework. 266 The adequacy decision
remained in effect after the second annual review. 267 Consequently, the PS
Framework excludes automated data processing which means that US-based
companies that self-certify to comply with PS Framework were not required to
comply with the GDPR provisions governing ADM. The FCRA act remains the
applicable legal regime in the US today.
ii.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Transparency
Provisions

The first rule under the FCRA that aims to enhance transparency allows the
consumer to access its file from consumer reporting agencies. 268 Hence, “[e]very
consumer reporting agency shall, upon request . . . clearly and accurately disclose
to the consumer all information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request.”269
The FCRA defines file broadly as “all of the information on the consumer recorded
There are seven principles, each entailing their own legal obligations that organizations must
comply with under the PS framework. These are the Notice Principle, the Data Integrity and
Purpose Limitation Principle, the Choice Principle, the Security Principle, the Access Principle,
the Recourse, Enforcement and Liability Principle, and the Accountability for Onward Transfer
Principle. Id. at recitals 20–28.
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and retained by a consumer reporting agency regardless of how the information is
stored.” 270 If the consumer requests only a credit file, the CRA has the obligation
to inform the consumer that they have the right to request and obtain a credit
score. 271 Additionally, the consumer has the right to obtain summary of their rights
on a model form prepared by the CFPB. 272
The CRA has the obligation not only to disclose a consumer file but also a
credit score if requested by the consumer together with the statement that “the
information and the credit score model may be different than the credit score that
may be used by the lender.” 273 Generally, lenders have no duty to provide credit
score to consumers ex ante. 274 Nevertheless, lenders that take adverse action, have
the obligation to provide the consumer’s credit score along with name and address
of the CRA that provided the information to the lender. 275 While the FCRA gives
the consumer the right to dispute the accuracy of information held by the CRA,276
it imposes several obligations on CRA, including obligations to take reasonable
steps to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of consumer reports. 277
Based on the overview of the FCRA rules on transparency, a few
conclusions can be drawn. First, there is no prohibition of ADM in consumer credit
risk assessment in the US. A fact-finding article published in 2018 revealed that “in
the US, automation, as opposed to human decision-making, is generally viewed as
less biased and a way to improve effectiveness, as well as a cost-saving
measure.” 278 The legal regime on automated credit scoring reflects this sentiment.
Second, the consumers’ right to information about credit report or credit score does
not necessarily include the right to obtain how the given credit score is calculated.
The consumer has the right to obtain their credit score along with the key factors
used in the scoring. 279 Nevertheless, similarly to EU consumers, US consumers
270
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equally enjoy the right to legally challenge adverse decisions regardless of the
limited information available.
There are multiples cases in the US involving ADM that led to massive
fines. In 2018, the FTC imposed a large fine on Realpage (CRA) for inaccurate
credit reporting. 280 Although the dispute involves credit report of potential tenants,
the process, provides insight into how consumers use the US legal regime to
confront ADM, including for consumer credit scoring. 281 In this case, Realpage
conducted a criminal background check on rental applicants using an automated
system. 282 Through name and birthdate of the applicant, the algorithm matches the
applicant with available criminal records. 283 This software program wrongly
attributed criminal records to certain applicants (e.g., finding matches between
Anthony Jones 10/15/67 and Antony Jones 10/15/67). 284 Realpage was fined for
deploying a defective algorithm. 285
In a more pertinent case, in 2017 the CFPB fined Conduent LLC (formerly
Xerox Business) $1.1 Million for inaccurate consumer credit reporting using an
automated process. 286 As a third-party service provider, Conduent provided
automated auto loan consumer credit reporting to lenders and credit reporting
agencies. 287 The information provided by Conduent was used to determine whether
the consumer qualified for loan or favorable loan terms. 288 The automated
consumer credit information provided by Conduent contained errors of various
categories in the files of over 1 million consumers, including a report of involuntary
repossession of vehicles, or errors on other critical consumer information including
account default related information. 289 Thus, Conduent used defective software to
automate the credit reporting, 290 and was held accountable under the FCRA.
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iii.

Oldy but Goody

The FTC and CFPB enforcement actions reveal that the existing legal rules
are capable of addressing technology-based challenges. In the case of Conduent,
even if it is a third party that provided consumer credit information, it is under
obligation to provide accurate credit reporting. 291 In the case of Realpage,
provisions of the FCRA have been applied to an automated criminal background
check. 292 The two cases demonstrate that the FCRA is capable of protecting the
consumer from adverse decisions, as much as the GDPR could, notwithstanding the
fact that it was enacted without explicitly addressing ADM. Nevertheless, it is also
likely that in more complex cases, the US consumer would be able to win a judicial
battle by compelling the data controller to disclose the decision-making process
under electronic discovery procedure. 293 Thus, despite the difference in the legal
rules in the two jurisdictions, the outcomes of legal controversies are likely to be
the same in both jurisdictions. Nevertheless, advanced machine learning credit
scoring presents an elevated challenge that legal rules in both jurisdictions are illprepared to tackle. 294
5. THE LIMITS OF THE LAW AND THE FUTURE OF AUTOMATED CONSUMER
CREDIT SCORING REGULATION
5.1.

MACHINE LEARNING CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING—A DEAD END

This article is a response to the prevailing view that consumers are more
vulnerable in the US than in the EU in the sphere of algorithmic credit scoring. It
has countered this view by examining the effectiveness of some of the legal rules
that are perceived as useful tools to protecting the consumer including consent and
transparency in the EU and demonstrated that US consumer credit law responds to
ADM in consumer credit scoring in a comparable manner. But, the key arguments
as well as the real cases used as illustration involved automated systems using the
so-called classical AI, a computer program that follows pre-determined set of rules
to produce an outcome. Automation can also be based on more advanced AI
The respondent is defined as a service provider and thus is a covered entity under 12 U.S.C.S. §
5481(26) (2021).
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systems include computer programs that update themselves as they encounter more
data. 295 This AI system known more loosely as machine learning could attain
autonomy and have agency (the ability to evaluate principles and make choices). 296
Thus, while rule-based AI is fairly controlled by a human agent as the software
programmer writes specific instruction for the decision making process, machine
learning might be out of control unless some procedure is put in place to keep
humans in the loop. Hence, the policy concerns raised by the two are quite different.
Machine learning may be effectively used for profiling online and
customizing search results as well as performing other tasks with different socioeconomic consequences. The use of machine learning techniques to profile
individuals outside consumer credit scoring is criticized for, among others,
misclassification of individuals based on characteristics that have nothing to do
with them, with serious implications including potential discrimination and
deprivation of individual autonomy. 297
Certainly, attempting to regulate the most advanced form of machine
learning using old legal rules is doomed to reach a dead end. Although there is no
evidence of the use of autonomous, unexplainable AI system in the consumer credit
industry, should such technology be deployed, the solution cannot be found in
tweaking the existing legal rules or even overhauling the law, whether in the EU or
the US. Even the GDPR’s presumably well-thought through and comprehensive
rules are inapt to regulating machine learning decisions. Commenting on the
GDPR’s right to explanation rule, Nick Wallace argues:
More importantly, those who drafted the GDPR do
not seem to understand that it is often not practical or
even possible, to explain all decisions made by
algorithms. For example, autonomous vehicles are
controlled by a multitude of algorithms that make
many kinds of decisions. It is possible to log these
actions, but it would take hours of work by highlypaid data scientists to render them intelligible. Often,
the challenge of explaining an algorithmic decision
295
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comes not from the complexity of the algorithm, but
the difficulty of giving meaning to the data it draws
on. 298
Today, even governments acknowledge the unpreparedness of the legal
regimes to address machine learning decisions. The United Kingdom’s
Government Office for Science noted that “most fundamentally, transparency may
not provide the proof sought: simply sharing static code provides no assurance that
it was actually used in a particular decision, or that it behaves in the wild in the way
its programmers expect on a given dataset.” 299
Machine learning decisions require a holistic and cautious approach to
regulation that strikes a fair balance between encouraging innovation and consumer
protection. In this last section of the article, key features of regulation of machine
learning consumer credit scoring are laid out.
5.2.

RISK-BASED APPROACH TO REGULATION

Any regulatory authority that is anxious about pervasive machine learning
decisions in the credit industry should reject the temptation to impose a categorical
ban or a prohibition that might stifle innovation. The more sensible solution is to
adopt sector specific and risk-based approach, 300 where if the benefits of machine
learning decision are outweighed by the costs of erroneous decisions, the system
should be banned or be subject to stricter scrutiny. Machine learning decisions raise
different types and degrees of concern in different spheres. To discuss a reasonable
policy framework for the regulation of machine learning decisions, those different
areas should be identified, isolated, and regulated, unless specific explanation is
offered to create a general regulatory framework.
The European Commission’s White Paper on Artificial Intelligence issued
in 2020 introduced a risk-based approach to future regulation of AI acknowledging
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that the current legal regime including the GDPR does not necessarily address
certain aspects of AI. 301 The white paper proposes a two-step analysis. The first
step is to identify certain AI applications that are generally regarded as high risk.302
The second step is to determine whether a given application within a sector is likely
to pose a significant risk. 303
In April 2021, the EU Commission published a Draft AI Regulation that
adopted the risk-based approach. 304 The DAIR has three categories of AI systems
to which different legal requirements apply. These are AI systems that pose (a)
unacceptable risk (banned), (b) high risk, and (c) limited risk. 305 An AI system used
for the assessment of the creditworthiness of natural persons (consumers) is listed
as a high-risk AI System under Annex III of the DAIR. 306 With respect to high-risk
AI Systems, stringent ex ante requirements are applied. These requirements relate
to risk management, data governance, transparency, record keeping, human
oversight, and robustness. 307
High risk AI Systems including those used for credit scoring are expected
to meet the requirements of conformity that must be monitored ex ante, 308 for
instance that a credit scoring algorithm is not used unless it does not pose risk to
the rights of the consumers (conformity). The requirements are imposed ex ante
with compliance supervised by the relevant state authority. The DAIR does not
address the rights of consumers aggrieved by an algorithmic decision (the right to
human intervention, explanation, and redress). These rights of the consumer (data
subject) are still to be governed by the GDPR unless the DAIR is revised before it
is adopted to change the status quo. Hence, if a scoring algorithm is approved to be
put to use and yet makes an inaccurate or discriminatory decision, the DAIR does
not have rules that the consumer can use for redress. Although some of the rules
including the one that requires automatic record-keeping allow the errors to be
traced easily that the consumer can potentially use in a legal proceeding, the DAIR
is not designed to address the rights of consumers that they can directly enforce.
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The current risk-based approach, therefore, does not resolve some of the
underlying problems in ADM in consumer credit risk assessment (e.g., the
difficulty in explaining machine learning decisions and the degree of disclosure of
information that is considered sufficient to satisfy the right to explanation).
Although the DAIR’s risk-based approach which treats consumer credit scoring AI
Systems as high risk is appropriate and the ex-ante conformity requirements are
robust, the approach does not necessarily satisfactorily protect the consumer from
machine learning decisions. For instance, one of the rules under the DAIR states
that “High-risk AI systems that continue to learn after being placed on the market
or put into service shall be developed in such a way to ensure that possibly biased
outputs due to outputs used as an input for future operations (‘feedback loops’) are
duly addressed with appropriate mitigation measures.” 309 This provision clearly
concedes that biased outputs may occur and in the case of machine learning
decisions, the user of the system should take mitigating measures for the future. If
taking a mitigation measure for the future is the most the law can expect deployers
of machine learning algorithms to perform in case of biases, it is fair to conclude
that remedy to the aggrieved consumer is not the priority. This triggers further
related questions. Does that mean for instance a machine learning decision can be
made in credit card, car loan, and mortgage loan applications provided that the AI
System has fulfilled the ex-ante conformity rules? Does that mean biased decisions
in these cases are to be addressed by way of implementing mitigation measures for
the future? The response to these questions appears to be affirmative and it is not
reassuring for EU consumers.
Granted, a financial institution might not use machine learning when
making important decisions such whether to grant a mortgage loan. But under the
DAIR, there is nothing that prevents them from doing so, if they have obtained the
necessary ex ante approval for the machine learning algorithm. This a dangerous
position to take while designing a legal framework for such a complex
phenomenon. The legal framework in this area, in addition to the overall risk-based
approach should be designed on sectoral basis. Thus, algorithmic credit scoring
requires its own legal framework that takes into account different types of credits.
5.3.

REGULATORY SANDBOXING

Regulatory sandbox is one of the most debated and increasing accepted
notions in the field of financial technology. In its most basic form, regulatory
sandbox is “a regulatory ‘safe space’ for experimentation with new approaches
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involving the application of technology to finance.” 310 As of July 2020, there are
over 40 countries around the globe including the United States that have either
announced or implemented some kind of regulatory sandbox. 311 There is no
consensus on the objective for implementing regulatory sandboxes. The United
States Department of Treasury in its 2018 report called for a regulatory sandbox
that aims to enhance financial innovation. 312 But, Allen argues that objectives of
regulatory sandbox should include not only encouraging innovation but also
protecting consumers and ensuring market stability. 313
While regulatory sandbox is premised on an entry barrier for Fintech
companies due to excessive regulatory burden, 314 it provides regulators the
opportunity to observe the regulatory challenges posed by a financial technology in
a controlled environment, 315 working with a FinTech company that provides
financial products or services to consumers without complying regulatory
requirements. 316
Current legal rules are ill-equipped to respond to a plethora of challenges
that could emerge from machine learning credit risk assessment. A regulatory
sandbox would provide an ideal environment for regulators to understand benefits
of various innovations and the risks they pose to consumers along with the possible
safeguards. According to the National Conference of State Law, fifteen US states
have either proposed or implemented regulatory sandbox laws. 317
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Under New York regulatory sandbox program, the company concerned has
twelve months, 318 subject to additional six months’ extension 319 to test its product
transaction with not more than 50,000 consumers that must be residents of New
York State. 320 Consumers have the right to get full disclosure of the nature of the
product or service they receive. 321
The CFPB also introduced a regulatory sandbox program effective from
September 2019. 322 The CFPB is criticized for its leniency toward market
regulation by exposing consumers to potential abuses as it permits companies to
test their products without complying with regulatory requirements, with no
administrative sanction or liability under private law. 323
Legal scholars investigating machine learning decisions are criticized for
their focus largely on the deployment of the algorithm and the actual decision
makings (the running model) rather than investigating other important stages in
machine learning process. 324 Lehr and Ohm argue that “another reason legal
scholars in particular need to focus on playing with the data is that combatting
harms at the running-model stage is often too little too late.” 325 They argue that
rather than focusing on discrimination at running model and during data collection,
discrimination is tackled better if an intervention is made at “several key, often
overlooked, stages of machine learning.” 326 They assert for instance that
“mitigating algorithmic discriminations require intervening during model tuning
and model training.” 327 “Model training includes tuning, assessment and feature
selection.” 328 Thus, an algorithm could be modified if it makes a disparate
classification at the stage of tuning. 329 Regulatory sandboxes could be designed not
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only to ensure inclusiveness in the machine learning training, but also to allow
regulatory agencies to obtain real time feedback on the challenges that could be
faced during the process.
Much can be written about flaws in the way the New York or CFBC
programs have been designed. For instance, the lack of cap on transaction values
that can be involved in a service benefiting from a regulatory program is
problematic because, one way of reducing consumer harm is to allow low value
transactions. Moreover, stronger cooperation between regulatory authorities and
the regulatory sandbox program recipients, including an exchange in technical
knowledge is lacking in both programs. Nevertheless, a carefully designed
regulatory sandbox could be valuable in regulating AI in the credit industry by
balancing various competing interests including consumer protection and
encouraging innovation.
The DAIR has also provisions on regulatory sandboxing. 330 The DAIR’s
provisions are woefully inadequate to address various challenges relating to
implementing a successful regulatory sandboxing program that advances
innovation while not undermining consumer rights. As the DAIR’s provisions are
to be implemented by the EU Member States through further legislation, it would
be futile to critique its limited number of provisions. Member States should invite
wider public participation in designing their implementing legislation.
6. CONCLUSION
Scholars have juxtaposed EU and US legal rules on ADM. The consensus
seems to be that the EU approach to the regulation of ADM is superior due to the
GDPR’s comparatively detailed provisions on transparency in ADM, as well as its
stringent consent requirements in addition to the applicable general prohibition of
significant solely ADM. This article rejects this conventional wisdom and has
argued that US consumer credit law has the necessary flexibility in
accommodating the challenges emanating from ADM in consumer credit until the
point where complex machine learning decisions are applied. The latter is a dead
end both for the EU and US legal regimes. The real question is where we go from
the dead end?
First, any regulatory intervention should balance the advantages of
efficiency and inclusiveness (if any) in financial services on the one hand, and
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consumer protection from potential inaccuracy and biases/discrimination on the
other. The legitimacy of any law is judged ultimately by its ability to strike a fair
balance between the costs and benefits, and its ability to maximize the benefits
and minimize the cost incurred by society.
The GDPR provisions governing ADM, although a good starting point for
regulatory debate, by no means achieve a fair balance between encouraging
innovation and consumer protection. Its general prohibition of solely ADM has
the potential to stifle innovation without making the consumer better off as in
Germany or to expose consumers to abuses as in the UK. The GDPR’s provisions
pertaining to consent and transparency in relation to ADM are as good as legal
rules found in decades’ old consumer credit laws in the US. This article
emphasizes therefore that if the US wishes to implement regulatory regimes on
ADM in the consumer credit industry, the GDPR is not the model to emulate.
Regarding complex machine learning decisions, the article proposed a
risk-based approach to regulating, and the heightened use of regulatory
sandboxing to allow FinTech companies to experiment their products in more fair
and transparent manner. Although the EU’s DAIR has incorporated both
recommendations, it is far from addressing the complex challenges of machine
learning.

56

